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Secure electric power system operation is key to social warfare. However,
recent years have seen numerous natural disasters and terrorist attacks that
threat the grid security. This dissertation summarizes the efforts to develop a
model to analyze cascading outages, an interdiction model to analyze worst-
case attacks on power grids, and research on grid resilience to natural dis-
asters. The developed cascading outage analysis model uses outage checkers
to systematically simulate the system behavior after an initial disturbance,
and calculate the potential cascading outage path and electric load shedding.
The new interdiction model combines the previously developed medium-term
attack-defense model with the short-term cascading outage analysis model to
find worst-case terrorist attack. The dissertation also reviews the research on
power grid resilience to natural disaster, and develops a framework to simulate
the impacts of hurricanes.
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Part I
Introduction
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Electric power systems provide an essential source for the operation of
the economy and for human well-being. Modern society is increasingly de-
pendent on reliable, secure and cost-efficient electricity supply. However the
electric grids, especially in U.S., are remarkably complex with some transmis-
sion lines spanning hundreds of miles. Terrorists could destroy key elements of
the electricity generation and delivery system, causing blackouts that are un-
precedented in this country in duration and extent [141]. In this dissertation,
we try to develop models and tools to simulate the effects of deliberate attacks,
find the worst possible scenarios, and develop techniques to mitigate the black-
outs. At the same time, recent years have seen many large electricity blackouts
across the globe due to natural disasters. The costs of such blackouts could be
billions and the social warfare could be significantly damaged because of such
events. Therefore, we conduct a survey on the existing state-of-art research
of power system resilience to natural disaters, and try to develop models to
simulate the impacts of natural disasters, and thus help decision makers be
better prepared to such events. More specifically, we divide this dissertation
into three parts, namely Cascading Outage Analysis, Integrated Interdiction
Model, and Power Grid Resilience under Natural Disasters.
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Many large blackouts are caused by a consecutive series of various out-
ages following an initial disturbance. The understanding and simulation of
such cascading outages are the foundation to provide reasonable assessment
of power grid disturbances caused by deliberate attacks or natural disasters.
Therefore, we build an enhanced cascading outage analysis tool to facilitate
this function. In part two, we incorporate this cascading outage analysis tool
to a worst-cast interdiction framework, in order to find out the worst-case
attack scenario on a power grid. In part three, we survey the research on nat-
ural disasters and provide a framework for forecasting natural disasters related
power outages.
The contributions in this work are:
• The enhancement of a Cascading Outage Analysis (COA) model and
research on mitigation of cascading outages;
• Incorporation of the COA model into an interdiction framework and the
development of an algorithm to solve the problem;
• Survey of state-of-art in power system resilience research on natural dis-
asters and models to forecast hurricane-related outage.
This dissertation is based on the author’s contribution in the papers
[215], [214], [217], [216], [210], [218] and [219].
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1.1 Background on Cascading Outage Analysis
Many large blackouts are caused by a consecutive series of various out-
ages following an initial disturbance. Once enough critical components of a
power system fail, the outages including transmission line, generator, and load
trips can sequentially spread and lead to large blackouts [209]. Nevertheless,
it is very difficult to identify critical components that represent weaknesses in
the power system and to analyze cascading outages due to the lack of detailed
blackout data and complicated electrical-physical interactions.
According to [209], [204], and [67], some major blackouts in North
America due to cascading outages are shown in Table 1.1.
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Table 1.1: Examples of Cascading Blackouts in North America [209], [204],
and [67]
Date Location Customers
Af-
fected/MW
Lost
Collapse
Time
Nature of Collapse
Nov. 9,
1965
Northeast 30 million 13 minutes Successive tripping
of lines
July 13,
1977
New York
City
1 million 1 hour Successive tripping
of lines and gener-
ators
Dec. 22,
1982
West Coast 12,350 MW Few Min-
utes
Successive line trip-
ping, protection co-
ordination scheme
failure
Dec. 15,
1994
Western
U.S.
9,336 MW N/A Transient instabil-
ity, successive trip-
ping of lines, volt-
age collapse
July 2,
1996
Western
U.S.
2 million 36 seconds Successive tripping
of lines, genera-
tors and voltage
collapse
Aug. 10,
1996
Western
U.S.
7.5 million >1 minute Voltage collapse
Aug. 14,
2003
Northeastern
and Mid-
western
U.S. and
Ontario,
Canada
55 million Few Min-
utes
Successive tripping
of lines, genera-
tors and voltage
collapse
Sep. 8,
2011
Southwestern
U.S.
7 million Few Min-
utes
Successive tripping
of lines and island-
ing
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1.2 Background on Interdiction Models
Secure electric power system operation is critical to society. It is noted
in [141] that some blackouts would not immediately kill many people or make
for spectacular television footage of bloody destruction. But if it were carried
out in a carefully planned way, by people who knew what they were doing,
it could deny large regions of the country access to bulk system power for
weeks or even months. An event of this magnitude and duration could lead to
turmoil, widespread public fear, and an image of helplessness that would play
directly into the hands of the terrorists. If such large extended outages were to
occur during times of extreme weather, they could also result in hundreds or
even thousands of deaths due to heat stress or extended exposure to extreme
cold. Therefore, it is important to think about what can be done to make
them less vulnerable to attack, how power can be rapidly restored if an attack
occurs, and how important services can be sustained while the power is out.
Deliberate attacks do not occur frequently, but when they do, they can
be disastrous [164]. Trying to quantitatively evaluate the probability of such
low-probability-high-consequence potential terrorist attacks is very challeng-
ing, resource demanding, and subject to inaccuracies. At the same time, the
outcome of an attack depends strongly on the current system operation con-
ditions during an attack, as well as the resources that terrorists have, both of
which are also highly uncertain. Bienstock et al. [33] developed a model that
includes a range of scenarios for the disruption. Chen et al. [50] use a prob-
abilistic approach to N − k analysis for naturally occurring events. However,
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given the uncertainties, the assumption made in the following work is that
the system operators, or defenders, should consider a “worst case” analysis in
order to correctly utilize a defense budget. Therefore, while the studies of [33]
and [50] are valuable, we aim to identify the worst-case attacks on a certain
system that an intelligent adversary might carry out.
Salmeron et al. [166] developed a bi-level optimization model that max-
imizes the medium-term “disruption” to the loads with given terrorist re-
sources. A heuristic algorithm was also proposed to solve the problem to a
near-optimal solution. In [6], a new algorithm called “Global Benders Decom-
position” is proposed to guarantee the convergence of the bi-level optimization
problem in [168]. Arroyo et al. [22] use a genetic algorithm to solve the in-
terdiction problem. Romero et al. [164] proposed a three-level mixed-integer
model, and used Tabu Search with an embedded greedy algorithm to seek an
optimum defense strategy. The power flow subproblem of these four models is
an “interdicted” DC optimal power flow model. Donde et al. [62] developed
a nonlinear optimization problem to detect the fewest possible transmission
line outages resulting in a system failure of specified severity. An AC optimal
power flow model is used in that paper. Carrion et al. [164] uses a stochastic
programming formulation to reinforce and expand a power system with the
objective of reducing the impact of deliberate attack. Smith et al. [186] also
studied different models and algorithms to solve network interdiction games.
While the optimal power flow (OPF) problem used in the interdiction
models, either AC or DC, represents the economical operation (medium-term)
7
of the power system by the Independent System Operators (ISOs), and maxi-
mizes the amount of load that can be served, it is a steady state optimization
framework that does not consider short-term cascading outage effects. The
phrase “medium-term” indicates a time window of minutes to hours or days,
and the phrase “short-term” means a time window of seconds to minutes.
To our knowledge, no literature combined the short-term cascading
effects and medium-term impacts of an interdiction.The primary contributions
in this work are: incorporation of a novel COA model into the interdiction
framework; and the development of an algorithm to solve the problem.
We note that it would never be possible to accurately identify terrorists’
motivation, at least not before an attack [168]. Consequently the modeling of
the attackers’ objective function is problematic. In this dissertation, combined
penalty costs associated with the amount of load shedding from a cascade and
medium-term operation are used to represent the consequence of a potential
terrorist attack.
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1.3 Background on Natural Disasters Impact on Power
Systems
Recent years have seen many blackouts due to natural disasters such as
the 2005 Hurricane Katrina blackouts, 2011 Japan Earthquake blackouts, and
2012 Hurricane Sandy blackouts. Between 2003 and 2012, roughly 679 power
outages, each affecting at least 50,000 customers, occurred due to weather
events in U.S. [64]. Hines et al [89] describes 933 events causing outages
from the years 1984 to 2006, and the data is presented in Table 1.21. The
study of natural disaster impacts on power grid can be traced back to 1930s,
when the 1938 New England Hurricane struck the Boston Area [79]. In the
last decades, there has been considerable progress in advancing methods for
analyzing natural disaster related issues in power systems. At the same time,
due to the complexity of the issue and its interdisciplinary nature, research
activities are conducted sparsely across different domains. We summarize the
natural disaster characteristics based on multiple sources such as [77], [89] in
Table 1.3.
1.4 Layout of this dissertation
This dissertation is organized in three main parts:
• Part I: Cascading Outage Analysis, where cascading outage analysis
models will be discussed in detail; mitigation techniques, examples and
1The totals are greater than 100% because some events fall into multiple initiating-event
categories.
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Table 1.2: Large Blackouts Causes in the United States [89]
Cause % of events Mean size Mean size
in MW in customers
Earthquake 0.8 1,408 375,900
Tornado 2.8 367 115,439
Hurricane/tropical storm 4.2 1,309 782,695
Ice storm 5.0 1,152 343,448
Lightning 11.3 270 70,944
Wind/rain 14.8 793 185,199
Other cold weather 5.5 542 150,255
Fire 5.2 431 111,244
Intentional attack 1.6 340 24,572
Supply shortage 5.3 341 138,957
Other external cause 4.8 710 246,071
Equipment failure 29.7 379 57,140
Operator error 10.1 489 105,322
Voltage reduction 7.7 153 212,900
Volunteer reduction 5.9 190 134,543
models are also discussed.
• Part II: Integrated Interdiction Model, where an analysis of power grid
interdiction is presented.
• Part III: Power Grid Resilience under Natural Disasters, where a survey
of current research on power grid resilience is conducted, and a tool to
analyze power system security under hurricane threats is presented.
Conclusion is provided in the last part of the dissertation.
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Table 1.3: Illustration of disaster characteristics based on multiple sources
Type Impact Region Predictability Span/area Affecting
time
Hurricane,
tropical
storm
Coastal regions 24-72 hours,
moderate to
good
Large (radius
up to 1,000
miles)
Hours to
days
Tornado Inland plains 0-2 hours,
bad to mod-
erate
Small (radius
up to 5 miles)
Minutes to
hours
Blizzard,
Ice Storm
High latitude
regions
24-72 hours,
moderate to
good
large, up to
1,000 miles
Hours to
days
Earthquake Regions on
fault lines
Seconds to
minutes, bad
Small to large Minutes to
days (after-
shock)
Tsunami Coastal regions Minutes
to hours,
moderate
Small to large Minutes to
hours
Drought,
Wild Fire
Inland regions Days, good Medium to
large
Days to
months
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Part II
Cascading Outage Analysis
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Chapter 2
Cascading Outage Analysis Model
Chapter 2 is based on author’s contribution in [215], [216], [218]. The
co-author Dr. Ross Baldick in these papers provided guidance, suggestions
and review of the research work. Cascading outage is the main mechanism of
large blackouts, and the duration of the sequence of cascading events can be
very short. In the 2003 North-Eastern America Blackout [204], 14 high voltage
transmission lines were tripped out within 5 minutes. In order to evaluate the
short term impacts of a particular attack, the amount of short-term load shed
should be calculated. Many efforts have been put into research to identify
the cause of these events and the methods to mitigate them. Eppstein et
al [62] has developed a Random Chemistry algorithm to identify the multiple
contingencies that initiate cascading failure. Hazra et al [83] proposes pattern
recognition and fuzzy estimation to calculate the cascading sequences of an
event. Jie Chen et al [49] introduces a hidden failure model with an embedded
DC model to study the cascading dynamics and mitigation. These methods are
either very computationally expensive, or did not very accurately represent the
system behaviour after the initial disturbances. Thus motivated, we propose
an outage checker based algorithm to simulate the potential cascading outage
of the system. Some of our previous work on developing sequential outage
13
checker based COA analysis is presented in [91] and [215]. In this chapter,
we provide an improved COA model, more detailed and accurate preventive
equipment modeling, and case studies using the IEEE test systems.
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2.1 Work flow of the COA
In previous models [91], [215], the cascading outage analysis is per-
formed with sequential application of the checkers. This sequence is applied
based on assumptions about the timing of various system protective actions
subject to different criteria. For example, we assume the transient stability
protection will detect rotor angle instability and trip generators before Under
Frequency Load Shedding (UFLS) activates. The frequency relay will deploy
UFLS before the over current relays trip the overloaded components, and over
current relays will act before the under voltage relays trip out the loads or
generators that experience voltage instability. However, in practice, the time
of potential relay actions for the frequency relays, over current relays, and
voltage relays could overlap. Once an element is tripped out (i.e., the line
tripped out by the fastest relay), the system topology is changed accordingly,
which will induce a sudden change of the power flow. The elements that were
not tripped out will experience different loading, and could then be tripped
by subsequent protective action. Therefore, in this report, simultaneous ap-
plication of protection is modeled by the checkers and more detailed models
of each protection scheme are implemented to provide a better representation
of the sequence of the cascade. The approach is also reported in [217].
The analysis starts from a specification of the initial disturbances. Then
the transient stability or rotor angle stability is checked by the Transient Sta-
bility Checker (TSC). If the generator rotor angle is larger than a certain
threshold, say, 100 degrees, the generator will be automatically tripped and
15
the analysis goes to the next cascading stage involving analysis with the TSC.
If the system reaches a transiently stable state, the COA activates the three
other checkers (frequency outage checker or FOC, overload outage checker or
OOC, voltage outage checker or VOC) simultaneously. Each checker is imple-
mented with a relay function to return a potential trip time. Then the COA
determines the first element to trip (if any). If the topology changes, the COA
will come to the next cascading stage and start the transient stability checker
again. The workflow diagram is shown in Figure 2.1.
16
Figure 2.1: Work flow of the COA
2.2 Design of the Transient Stability Checker (TSC)
Transient stability, or rotor angle stability is the ability of the power
system to remain in synchronism when subjected to large transient distur-
bances [93]. According to [126], the power system dynamic behavior can be
represented as a set of differential equations (2.1) and a set of algebraic equa-
tions (2.2).
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x˙ = f(x, y) (2.1)
0 = g(x, y) (2.2)
The solution of these two set of equations defines the electromechanical
state of the power system at any instant in time. A disturbance in the network
usually requires a change to both the network configuration and boundary
conditions. These are modeled by changing the coefficients in the functions
appearing on the right-hand side of equations (2.1) and (2.2).
In the context of transient stability under disturbances, these distur-
bances may include faults on transmission elements, loss of load, loss of gen-
eration, etc. Notice that the faults on the transmission elements, which are
typically short-circuit to the facilities, if cleared and re-closed successfully,
should not result in physical destruction of the assets. This is very different
from the physical attack aimed at damaging the facilities, since permanent
damage could contribute to long-term impacts on the system. A short-circuit
type of attack could easily be initiated by applying conductive material (e.g.
piece of metal, etc) to the transmission elements (e.g. overhead transmission
lines, etc). Transient stability analysis has been performed in power system
analysis by many methods. [231] and [58] use time-domain simulation to cal-
culate the exact system response in time by implicitly numerically integrating
the differential equations (1) and solve the algebraic equations (2) at each time
step. The timedomain simulation is the most accurate method, but is slow
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in computation and does not provide any measurement of degree of system
stability. Transient energy function (TEF) and potential energy boundary
surface (PEBS) [71], [43], [52] methods avoid making numerical integration by
constructing energy functions and comparing the system energy (when fault
is cleared) to a critical energy value estimated by the energy fuctions to de-
termine wherther or not the system will remain stable. These methods are
fast in computation compared to the time simulation, and also able to provide
useful information regarding the degree of stability or instability. However,
they are only applicable to power system stability models having energy func-
tions, and are not as accurate as numerical integration. Hybrid methods [129]
combines the numerical integration and the energy functions method. As indi-
cated in [217] we use time-domain simulation to perform the transient stability
assessment because of its high accuracy. The time-domain simulation allows
taking into account the full system dynamic model and consists in checking
that inter-machine rotor angle deviations lie within a specific range of values.
We choose to use time-domain simulation in this work.
Different models have been used to represent different dynamic char-
acteristics of the generator. In our simulation, a “GENROU” model is se-
lected to represent the round rotor generator. It is noticeable in [158] that
the GENROU model provides a very good approximation of the behavior of
synchronous generator. More than 2/3 of the machines in the 2006 North
American Eastern Interconnect case (MMWG) are represented by GENROU
models. Additionally, standard “IEEE T1” exciter model is used to repre-
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sent a brushless alternating current (AC) exciter with a rotating rectifier, and
“IEEE G1” governor model is used to represent the governor response model.
The transient stability checker uses the PowerWorld transient stability
solver to numerically calculate the system response after a fault. If the rotor
angle deviation of a generator is bigger than a certain threshold, say, 100
degrees, the generator will automatically be tripped. To illustrate this scheme
more clearly, a simulation example is shown in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3.
The simulation is performed using IEEE RTS-96 one area test case [4].
The first scenario is a three phase fault applied on the transmission line from
Bus 13 to Bus 11, circuit 1, at 1.0 second, and the relays cleared the fault
at 1.1 second. Three generator rotor angles (Gen 13 unit 1, Gen 13 unit 2,
Gen 23 unit 1) are plotted. As can be seen from the Figure 2.2, the system
experienced some fluctuations, but finally remained stable.
Second scenario is performed under the same setting, but with a fault
clearing time changed from 1.1 seconds to 1.3 seconds. As can be seen from the
Figure 2.3, the generator angle deviations increase dramatically, and generator
unit 1 at bus 13 is tripped out due to angle deviation larger than 100 degrees
at roughly 1.324 seconds.
The implementation of transient stability enables the Cascading Outage
Analysis (COA) model to include transient stability assessment (or rotor angle
stability problem), and hence provides a more accurate representation of the
system behavior.
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Figure 2.2: Generator angle for scenario one, stable swing
Figure 2.3: Generator angle for scenario two, unstable swing
2.3 Frequency Outage Checker (FOC)
Since the numerical integration method used in the transient stability
checker is relatively computationally expensive, we limit the simulation time
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window to be 4 seconds, which is typically more than enough time to address
the rotor angle deviation. However, if a mismatch of the generation and load
happens, a subsequent frequency excursion will occur, typically after the rotor
angle transient dies out. The frequency excursion may then trigger the over-
or under-frequency protection. To represent this possibility, the frequency
outage checker (FOC) is designed to model the protection behavior against
system over or under-frequency events. In the frequency outage checker, a
system frequency response (SFR) model [19] is used as a frequency response
model. In the model, nonlinearities and all but the largest time constants
in the equations of the generating units of the power system are neglected,
with the added assumption that the generation dynamics are dominated by
reheat steam turbine generators.1 Topologically, the model replaces separate
machines by a single large machine that is connected to the individual gen-
erator buses through ideal phase shifters. Consequently, the model produces
an average frequency response shape of a system. In this report, frequency
outages are specified in accord with the frequency outage standard from ER-
COT [63]. According to this standard, when the system frequency violates a
pre-determined threshold for a certain amount of time, the under frequency
relays will operate to deploy under frequency load shedding. The equations
(2.3) and (2.4) show the frequency response model that is used to calculate
the frequency response.
1With increasing capacities of gas turbine and combined cycle gas turbines, this assump-
tion is not literally true in, e.g. ERCOT. However, the resulting second order model for
frequency may still be a reasonably accurate representation.
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f(t) =
RPstep
(DR+Km)2π
[1 + αe−ςωntsin(ωrt+ φ)] + 60 (2.3)
f(t) = K (2.4)
where,
ω2n =
DR +Km
2HRTR
ς = (
2HR + (DR +KmFH)TR
2(DR+Km)
ωn)
α =
√
1− 2TRςωn + T 2Rω2n
1− ς2
ωr = ωn
√
1− ς2
φ = tan−1(
ωrTR
1− ςωnTR )− tan
−1(
√
1− ς2
−ς )
In the above equations, R is governor droop, ∆ω is incremental speed
in per unit, FH is fraction of total power generated by the HP turbine, TR is
reheat time constant in seconds, H is inertia constant in seconds, D is damping
factor, Km is mechanical power gain factor, Pstep is disturbance magnitude in
per unit and K is pre-defined threshold frequency.
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Figure 2.4 shows how to obtain the under frequency time duration from
the frequency functions. The time when the frequency first drops under the
frequency threshold, t1, and the time when the frequency first rises up to the
threshold again, t2, are determined to calculate the time duration (t2 − t1).
To determine the intersection of two functions (2.3) and (2.4), one could solve
equation (2.5) by methods described in [233].
RPstep
(DR +Km)2π
[1 + αe−ςωntsin(ωrt + φ)] + 60 = K (2.5)
If there are two solutions to (2.5), they are the values of t1 and t2. As a result,
time duration for a specific threshold frequency can be obtained as (t2− t1). If
there is no solution, the time-delay is not calculated, thus the frequency relay
will not be triggered. If there is one solution, the frequency of the intersect is
compared with the UFLS settings. When intersect frequency is lower than the
UFLS threshold, the UFLS may still be deployed but the frequency may not
restore to the pre-disturbance level. When the intersect frequency equal to the
UFLS threshold, no UFLS scheme will be deployed. An example frequency
curve is shown in Figure 2.4.
As seen in Figure 2.4, the lowest point of frequency value should be the
first local minimizer of the frequency curve. This is due to the fact that the
curve is a damped sine wave and the following local minimizers will be closer
to 60 Hz. In an optimization problem like calculating minimum frequency
fmin, the first order condition to find the local minimizer can be applied. If
the derivative of the function at one point is zero, then this point is a local
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Figure 2.4: An example frequency drop curve
minimizer, maximizer, or inflection point. In this problem, finding a point
t which satisfies the equation ∇f(t) = 0 in the first cycle of the curve is
necessary to obtain the time of minimum frequency.
After calculating the time duration in the FOC, it determines whether
the calculated time duration (CTD) of frequency violation exceeds the set
time duration (STD) of the protective relay. If STD is greater than CTD, the
frequency checker selects the next generator according to a user defined order
and compares two time duration values. If a frequency violation is detected in
the calculation step, the FOC will return the time at which under frequency
load shedding will be deployed. The time will later be used in cascading
comparison algorithm.
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2.4 Overload Outage Checker (OOC)
Line overloading for violating thermal limits is an important and com-
mon measure to identify the mechanism of cascading outages and to assess
vulnerability to cascading outages [216]. In a cascading outage scenario perti-
nent to line overloading, a line outage can cause increased flows on other lines,
potentially leading to overloading of the other lines. As a result, when a line
violates the thermal limit, the overloaded lines may be tripped.
A normal inverse time-overcurrent model described in Siemens SIPRO-
TEC 5 Current Relay [185] is implemented. The time when the over current
relay trips the element is determined by (2.6).
T =
0.14
( I
Ith
)0.02 − 1 · Tp[s] (2.6)
Where Ith is the current threshold value of the relay. Tp is the setting
value of the relay. The normal inverse current relay characteristic is shown in
Figure 2.5. Note that in some cases a sag of a transmission line may result in
a short circuit to other objects, e.g. a tree. This phenomenon was observed
in 2003 North America blackout [204]. We are not modeling this issue in the
COA.
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Figure 2.5: Normal Inverse Current Relay Characteristic [185]
2.5 Voltage Outage Checker (VOC)
Another typical character of cascading outages includes under (or over)
voltage problem. When the system is highly stressed, the voltage profiles of
power systems may decline. Similar to the line outage checker, when a voltage
profile for a bus violates a pre-defined chosen threshold to maintain system
stability, the voltage outage checker (VOC) may activate. If a bus voltage
stays below the lower limit during the VOC process although the power flow
calculation converges, load shedding action may be taken to maintain bus
voltages within limits [216].
A standard Inverse time characteristic model described in ABB RXEDK
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Figure 2.6: Inverse Voltage Relay Characteristic [11]
2H Time over/undervoltage relay [11] is implemented in voltage relay model-
ing. The time that under or over voltage relay trips the element is determined
in (2.7) and (2.8).
Overvoltage : T =
k
U
U1
− 1[s] (2.7)
Undervoltage : T =
k
1− U
U1
[s] (2.8)
Where k is the inverse time constant, U1 is the over/under voltage relay
pick-up value, U is the user defined relay operating value. The inverse voltage
relay characteristic curve is shown in Figure 2.6.
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2.6 Implementation and case study of COA
Both the previous COA model discussed in [215] and the proposed
improved COA model is implemented on a 2.5GHz dual core laptop with 4GB
RAM. The simulations have been performed using IEEE 118 bus test case [2]
and IEEE 300 bus test case [3]. Average simulation time is 3 seconds for
previous COA model, and 3.5 seconds for the improved model. The increase
of the computational time is due to the fact that three checkers (FOC, OOC,
VOC) have to run every time the system passes through TSC stage to obtain
potential tripping time, while in the previous model, the simulation stops or
proceeds to the next cascading stage after one checker is activated. In our
simulation, transmission line and transformer MVA limits are set relatively
tight in order to illustrate the cascading scenarios.
The cascading outage analysis (COA) tool has been built on the Win-
dows based Visual Basic Applications (VBA) [132] in order to support vari-
ous distributed computing environments and interaction with other programs
such as PowerWorld simulator [158] and MS Excel [131]. The implementation
framework is shown in Figure 2.7. The high level control work flow, along
with the relay models and frequency calculation algorithm are implemented
using VBA. The AC power flow calculation and the numerical integration of
the transient stability checker are based on the PowerWorld simulator results.
A report including the post COA powerflow, transient rotor angle data, and
the potential cascading outage data is given in multiple excel worksheets. A
Graphical User Interface (GUI) is also designed to enable customized user in-
29
Figure 2.7: Implementation framework of the COA
put, settings, and to show a real-time simulation log. The design of the GUI
is shown in Figure 2.8.
2.6.1 IEEE 118 Bus System
To illustrate operation of the COA and the difference between the pre-
vious COA model and the improved model, a particular initiating event is
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Figure 2.8: Graphical User Interface of the COA
chosen. In this IEEE 118 Bus System simulation, the initial disturbances are
tripping transmission line 35-37-1, transformer 38-37-1 and transmission line
45-49-1. The cascading outage sequence simulated by the COA model de-
scribed in [215] is shown in table 2.1. The cascading sequence simulated by
the improved COA model is shown in table 2.2.
As can be seen from the results, when compared with previous work
[215], the improved COA model proposed in this report indicated a different
cascading path. However, the cascading events seen from the improved model
are also shown in table 2.1 at analogous stages. The improved model provides
a better representation of time sequence of the cascade, and avoids tripping
out many elements that should not be tripped due to practical relay time
setting. For example, at the first stage, as revealed from table 2.2, three lines
are overloaded, but in fact only one line 45-46-1 will be tripped out because
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Table 2.1: Cascading Sequence of IEEE 118 Bus Case using model in [215]
fromNum toNum ID Category Stage
15 33 1 Line Overload 1
45 46 1 Line Overload 1
68 81 1 Line Overload 1
15 19 1 Line Overload 2
18 19 1 Line Overload 2
19 34 1 Line Overload 2
34 43 1 Line Overload 2
37 40 1 Line Overload 2
39 40 1 Line Overload 2
40 42 1 Line Overload 2
41 42 1 Line Overload 2
42 49 1 Line Overload 2
42 49 2 Line Overload 2
65 68 1 Line Overload 3
23 24 1 Line Overload 4
26 25 1 Line Overload 4
47 49 1 Line Overload 4
49 69 1 Line Overload 4
Blackout
of the shortest time delay (0.446s).
Table 2.2: Cascading Sequence of IEEE 118 Bus Case using improved model
fromNum toNum ID Category Stage Time
45 46 1 Line Overload 1 0.446482
15 33 1 Line Overload 2 0.856211
19 34 1 Line Overload 3 1.118852
Blackout
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2.6.2 IEEE 300 Bus Test Case
Another simulation is performed on IEEE 300 Bus Test System. The
initial disturbances are tripping transmission line 7002-2-1, and 3-1-1. The
cascading outage sequence simulated by COA model proposed in [215] is shown
in table 2.3. The cascading sequence simulated by the improved COA model
is shown in table 2.4.
The improved model indicates similar cascading path at analogous
stages, but the new model reveals the sequence of each protective device op-
eration. At the time of 4.6386s, the system will be blacked out after 9 stages
of cascading outage.
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Table 2.3: Cascading Sequence of IEEE 300 Bus Test Case using model in [215]
fromNum toNum ID Category Stage
3 2 1 Line Overload 1
7 6 1 Line Overload 1
8 11 1 Line Overload 2
16 15 1 Line Overload 3
15 37 1 Line Overload 4
37 41 1 Line Overload 4
2 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
6 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
8 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
14 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
15 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
17 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
89 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
90 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
9031 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
9031 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
9032 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
9033 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
9035 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
9036 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
9037 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
9038 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
9040 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
9041 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
9042 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 5
Blackout
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Table 2.4: Cascading Sequence of IEEE 300 Bus Test Case using improved
model
fromNum toNum ID Category Stage Time(s)
7 6 1 Line Overload 1 0.5624
3 2 1 Line Overload 2 0.8844
8 11 1 Line Overload 3 1.2327
16 15 1 Line Overload 4 1.7786
15 37 1 Line Overload 5 2.1786
6 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 6 2.7604
2 N/A 1 Load UnderVoltage 7 3.3922
15 89 1 Line Overload 8 4.0316
15 90 1 Line Overload 9 4.6386
Blackout
2.7 Summary and future work
In this chapter, a cascading outage analysis model (COA) is proposed
and tested through the implementation and simulations discussed above. The
model provides a way to evaluate the short term impacts of an attack, e.g. the
amount of short-term load shed. The COA model applies four outage check-
ers, namely Transient Stability Checker, Frequency Outage Checker, Overload
Outage Checker, and Voltage Outage Checker to simulate the system behav-
ior after an initial disturbance, i.e. an attack. The proposed COA model is
compared with the previous model, and has shown advantages including more
accurate relay model representations and better cascading sequence calcula-
tion.
The cascading outage analysis has several limitations. Potential im-
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provements include:
• The cascading outage analysis model does not consider breaker failures
and back-up protection schemes such as zone-2 and zone-3 protection.
The future work may include these models to reflect the real-world sce-
narios.
• The cascading outage analysis model uses a set of pre-determined param-
eters and settings for protection devices. In the industry applications,
different coordinations and settings among various protection scehems
may lead to different system behavior. Software such as CAPE could
assist the optimization and design of the protection schemes [1].
• There are some control schemes in the power systems, including con-
trolled islanding schemes and automatic tap changers, etc that are not
modeled in the cascading outage analysis tool. These sophisticated mod-
els could be incorporated and studied to make the simulation results
more reflective of reality.
Given the ability to simulate the potential cascades, a natural next
step is to develop proper methods and mechanisms to mitigate and prevent
cascading outages. In the next chapter, these issues are studied.
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Chapter 3
Mitigation and Prevention of Cascading
Outages
This Chapter is based on the Author’s contribution in [210] and [219].
Co-authors in [210] have contributed to the editing and review of the paper.
Dr. Jianhui Wang and Dr. Ross Baldick in [219] provided guidance and sugges-
tions on the algorithms described in the paper. Techniques are used to prevent
or mitigate potential cascading outages, including Special Protection Systems
(SPS), Remedial Action Systems (RAS), and intentional islanding schemes. In
this chapter, we review the current practice to mitigate the cascading outages,
and propose a framework to design wide-area protection systems.
3.1 Mitigation and Prevention of Cascading Outages:
Methodologies and Practical Applications
3.1.1 Background and Mitigation Techniques
Due to the complexity of the cascading outages, the methodologies and
practical applications to mitigate such events are limited and subject to uncer-
tainties. Measures for mitigating and/or preventing cascading outages depend
on the type of event [209]. The process of determining preventive measures [99]
is shown in Figure 3.1. As can be seen from the figure, control actions to imme-
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diately respond to the unforeseen events play a vital role to prevent cascades.
Due to the infrequent deployment of such control actions, they are commonly
implemented in devices or schemes called “Special Protection Schemes” or “Re-
medial Action Schemes”. The North Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
glossary defines a RAS as: An automatic protection system designed to de-
tect abnormal or predetermined system conditions, and take corrective actions
other than and/or in addition to the isolation of faulted components to main-
tain system reliability [5]. Considerable effort over the last several decades has
been devoted to the research, various implementation and operational issues
of SPS or RAS1 [210], [147], [18], [199], [96], [106], [200], [157], [127]. The de-
velopment and practical applications of SPS are given in [194], [211], [198], [6].
Most of the design and investment decisions are made to implement a single
SPS scheme (e.g., line switching, generation trip) to tackle one particular line
overload or other instability phenomena. However, for some severe n− k con-
tingencies, multiple instability phenomena could be present, and single SPS
device implementations may not be able to relieve the system stress. Accord-
ing to [210], all recommendations learned by recent blackouts point towards
the need for increased coordination between operators in terms of protection
settings, real-time information exchanges, system studies and planning in an
emergency state, and information sharing about system conditions of neigh-
boring TSOs. However, current SPSs are primarily identified and developed
1For brevity, we use SPS to stand for both the Special Protection Schemes and Remedial
Action Systems.
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Figure 3.1: Preventive measures/islanding for different types of cascading
events [210]
based on ad-hoc procedures [84].
3.1.2 Cases of successful and unsuccessful mitigation of cascading
outages and lessons learned
This section presents examples of successful and unsuccessful mitigation
of cascading outages, and summarizes lessons learnt after investigation of these
events.
Cases of unsuccessful mitigation
In 2012, the largest case of unsuccessful mitigation occurred in India [44]
with the loss of nearly 700 million customers. With the initial cause still
under investigation, a severely weakened system coupled with large unsched-
uled interchanges led to highly loaded tie lines. Load encroachment (apparent
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impedance entering the protective zone) tripped these tie-lines after inade-
quate operator relief actions. The resulting power swings split-up the system
where lines continued to trip from under-frequency/over-voltage actions which
eventually caused total collapse of all three grids.
On the afternoon of September 8, 2011, an 11-minute system distur-
bance occurred in the Pacific Southwest, leading to cascading outages and
leaving approximately 2.7 million customers without power [67]. According to
the investigation report [67], the outages affected parts of Arizona, Southern
California, and Baja California, Mexico. All of the San Diego area lost power,
with nearly one-and-a-half million customers losing power, some for up to 12
hours. The disturbance occurred near rush hour, on a business day, snarling
traffic for hours. Schools and businesses closed, some flights and public trans-
portation were disrupted, water and sewage pumping stations lost power, and
beaches were closed due to sewage spills. Millions went without air condition-
ing on a hot day. The sequence of the events are summarized below:
The loss of a single 500 kilovolt (kV) transmission line, namely Arizona
Public Services (APS) Hassayampa-N. Gila 500 kV line (H-NG), which is a
segment of the Southwest Power Link (SWPL), a major transmission corri-
dor that transports power from generators in Arizona to the San Diego area,
initiated the event. Power flows significantly increased through lower voltage
systems to the north of the SWPL, while there was lower than peak genera-
tion levels in San Diego and Mexico. As a consequence, some sizeable voltage
deviations and equipment overloads occured throughout the system. Signifi-
40
cant overloading occurred on three of the Imperial Irrigation District (IID)’s
230/92 kV transformers located at the Coachella Valley (CV) and Ramon
substations, as well as on Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC)
Path 44, located south of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS)
in Southern California. The flow redistributions, voltage deviations, and re-
sulting overloads had a ripple effect, as transformers, transmission lines, and
generating units tripped oﬄine, initiating automatic load shedding throughout
the region in a relatively short time span. Just seconds before the blackout,
Path 44 carried all flows into the San Diego area as well as parts of Arizona
and Mexico. Eventually, the excessive loading on Path 44 initiated an intertie
separation scheme at SONGS (RAS), designed to separate SDG&E from SCE.
The SONGS separation scheme separated SDG&E from Path 44, led to the loss
of the SONGS nuclear units, and eventually resulted in the complete blackout
of San Diego and Comisioˆn Federal de Electricidads (CFE) Baja California
Control Area. During the 11 minutes of the event, the WECC Reliability Co-
ordinator (WECC RC) issued no directives and only limited mitigating actions
were taken by the Transmission Operators (TOPs) of the affected areas.
Cases of successful mitigation
In 2008 [140], an exceptionally rare event on the UK network resulted in fre-
quency being outside the statutory limit for 9 minutes. Two large genera-
tors tripped within 2 minutes, which already exceeded the maximum credible
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loss, followed by two further units. This loss and further tripping of embed-
ded generation in the distribution system caused frequency to drop to 48.795
Hz. This frequency drop was stopped by load shedding schemes and National
Grid (TSO) was then able to restore system frequency and instructed affected
DNOs to restore the dropped load within a range of 20-40 minutes. Only
1.5% of demand was shed instead of the expected 6.5% due to relay design
accuracy. Successful coordination between the TSO and the DNOs meant that
fewer customers were disconnected and system collapse avoided. In 2006, a
major disturbance in Europe [202] highlighted the importance of coordination
between operators. A planned outage by E.ON Netz (TSO), not properly eval-
uated for N-1 security, initiated the event. Also, the fact that one tie-line had
different protection settings on each end connecting two TSOs was not consid-
ered in their evaluation. This line trip then initiated cascades throughout the
UCTE system due to over-current distance protection and out of synchronism
relays which caused the UCTE system to split into three areas. A blackout
was narrowly avoided due to the actions of TSOs in their individual control
areas. In both under-frequency areas, sufficient generation and load shedding
allowed the restoration of normal frequency within 20 minutes. In the over-
frequency area, where frequency increased further as wind farms that tripped
in the disturbance came back on line, restoration took longer due to a lack of
coordination between TSOs and DNOs.
42
3.1.3 Lessons Learned
While events are usually unique, there share many common factors
such as a lack of coordination in key areas. A number of events highlighted
the lack of coordination and information between TSOs operating in an inter-
connected region. All recommendations point towards increased coordination
between operators in terms of protection settings, real time exchanges, system
studies and planning and role in an emergency state, and system conditions of
neighbouring TSOs. Also, a recommendation from [67] looked at the WECC
Reliability Coordinator for coordinating actions in emergency situations as
they have a bigger picture of events. Not only are there lessons to be learnt
from coordination between operators, but the WECC 2011 event highlighted
the need for RAS and SPS to be properly coordinated for protection within
the TSO’s own regions, but also across interconnected regions. When acting in
an emergency state, operators need to be trained to deal with these situations
and understand and act in an urgent manner.
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3.2 Integrated wide-area protection design framework
Measures for mitigating cascading outages are discussed in [210], but
investment and implementation of new wide-area protection schemes were not
considered. Other frameworks are also discussed in [10, 13], but did not include
a systematic approach to optimize the investment decisions regarding multiple
protection actions. Based on these frameworks, we propose a two-step invest-
ment framework for design of wide-area protection systems to mitigate the
cascading outages:
1. Identify the severe multiple contingencies that could potentially
cause cascading outages, and the corresponding arming conditions when such
contingencies may occur. Review existing budget constraints, available tech-
nologies (e.g., generation reduction, line switching, etc) to deploy and their
associated deployment costs.
2. Construct an optimization program to find the optimal investment decision
for various SPSs.
The initiating events for step one that are considered in this chapter
are severe instantaneous multiple contingencies from extreme situations such
as natural disasters or deliberate attacks. We do not consider probabilistic
models of the initiating events due to the complexity of the existing frame-
work. However probability models could be incorporated into this framework
in the future. The investment decisions should be made upon clear understand-
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ing of the budget constraints and availability of the technologies. Figure 3.2
shows the most common SPS techniques currently deployed in WECC [210].
We use the three most commonly used technologies as available investment
candidates (i.e., Generation Trip, Transmission Switching and Load Shed).
The investment cost2 for setting up the SPSs includes the deployment of spe-
cific measuring units to detect certain initiating events, a protected and secure
communication channel, as well as the techniques used to conduct certain op-
erations (e.g. controlled circuit breakers, specified generator controls, etc).
The SPS arming configuration is important, and the system operator should
carefully set the SPSs to be automatically armed when certain system operat-
ing points are met and the probability of multiple contingency occurrence is
high. The cyber security of this system should also be studied carefully, and
may induce additional costs as compared to other protection schemes. Since
the focus of this paper is to present the basic investment framework, we do
not discuss cyber security issues at this stage.
In Step two, the optimization programming model is formed to identify
the investment strategy of the wide area protection systems. The purpose of
using this programming model is to find the optimal locations and techniques
where SPSs are implemented, so that the potential cascading outages could
be mitigated, and at the same time budget constraints are satisfied. In this
dissertation we assume the SPSs will be deployed simultaneously when the
2As the SPSs will be operated automatically, the operating cost of the SPSs is minimal
and not considered in this paper.
45
Figure 3.2: Percentage of SPS techniques deployed in WECC [210]
severe contingency happens.
If the cascading outage can not be avoided given a certain severe con-
tingency and budget, many papers have discussed islanding strategies. [165],
[32], [113], [213], [174]. Finally, if there is significant risk of having a black-
out after a particular initiating event, black start schemes may be designed to
ensure a fast and secure pick up of the load.
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3.3 Future Direction in Mitigation of Cascading Out-
ages
Both technical and cooperative advances are enabling new ideas to im-
prove power system reliability. Driving demand for these new ideas are changes
in generation characteristics, limitations in infrastructure installations, along
with modern society’s continuously increasing dependence on electric power.
An important technical advance is the ability to measure the power system
network state with precise time-stamps, and communicate these synchrophasor
measurements at a high rate. Advances in communication infrastructure allow
streaming measurements both between distributed control devices and between
these devices and the control center. In North America, the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) [55], has participated with the installment
and interconnection of hundreds of phasor measurement units (PMU) across
the power system. Measurements are communicated within each utility and
between the utilities and their regional coordinating center. This is bring-
ing new monitoring capability which increases the situational awareness at
each entity. PMUs provide a set of initial measurements that aid in detecting
and mitigating voltage collapse [156]. Their advantages include a high pro-
cessing rate and immunity from the convergence problems of nonlinear state
estimation. For transient stability related outages, adding time-synchronized
measurements of the generator rotor angle [236] will enable new protection
and automated control [173]. The result is that generators stay synchro-
nized during severe contingencies. Coordination between utilities provides
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the opportunity for future mitigation measures. In Europe, the ENTSO-E has
proposed new recommendations [61]. Recommendations include harmonisa-
tion among UFLSs; developing a standard for the blocking of On Load Tap
Changers (OLTC) and for Under-Voltage Load Shedding (UVLS) in the CE
Synchronous Area; and ensuring high performance of line protections with
respect to their original function (fault clearing) while implementing System
Protection Schemes to protect the system against loss of stability.
3.4 Part Summary and Conclusion
In this part, we developed an improved framework of Cascading Out-
age Analysis model with four checkers, namely Transient Stability Checker,
Frequency Outage Checker, Overload Outage Checker and Voltage Outage
Checker. We implemented the algorithm and tested on IEEE test cases. We
also discussed mitigation and prevention of cascading outages. In the next
part, we incorporate the developed Cascading Outage Analysis model in an
interdiction framework that considers both short- and medium-term impacts.
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Part III
Integrated Interdiction Model
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Chapter 4
Intergrated Model and Solution Algorithm
4.1 Introduction and I-DC-OPF Model
This part summarizes work on analyzing interdiction of electric power
grids. The content of this chapter is based on author’s contribution in [217].
The co-author Dr. Ross Baldick has contributed research ideas on the algo-
rithms described in the paper and editing. An improved interdiction model to
identify maximal electric grid attacks that incorporates both short-term (sec-
onds to minutes) and medium-term (minutes to days) impacts of the possible
attack has been proposed. The medium-term impacts are examined by an
interdicted DC optimal power flow model (I-DC-OPF) building on previously
reported work. The short-term impacts are addressed by a cascading outage
analysis model (COA), as described in the part II, that uses a set of system-
atically applied checkers to perform the simulation of the cascading outage
events and assess the short-term impacts of a blackout subsequent to specified
terrorist attacks. An integer programming heuristic is applied that can uti-
lize standard optimization software (e.g. CPLEX) to solve master problems
generated by the heuristic. The proposed model has been verified using the
IEEE 300 Bus Test System and IEEE RTS 96 Test System. Discussions of the
results and future research plans are also presented in this dissertation.
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As in [166] and [168], we also simulate the medium-term operation of
a grid using a set of linearized DC optimal power flow models (DC-OPF).
While the grid repair, restoration and the unit-commitment issues that arise
as service is restored to different parts of the grid are important, we do not
consider those long-term problems in this report. Some of these issues have
been discussed in [34] and will be considered in the future work (see chapter
6). The objective function for I-DC-OPF includes terms for generation costs
and for penalty costs associated with shed power or energy. The penalties
approximate both the direct and indirect costs of the corresponding unserved
demand.
We use the subproblem of the “interdicted power flow model” (IPF)
as stated in [166] as the interdicted DC-OPF formulation. The formulation is
shown below:
Formulation : I −DC − OPF (L,G, I; d, δ)
z(δ) = min
PG,PL,S,θ
∑
g
hgP
G
g +
∑
i
∑
c
qicSic (4.1)
s.t.
PLl = Bl(θo(l) − θd(l))(1− δLl )(1− δIo(l))(1− δId(l)), ∀l ∈ L, (4.2)
∑
g∈Gi
PGg −
∑
l∈L|o(l)=i
PLl +
∑
l∈L|d(l)=i
PLl =
∑
c
(dic − Sic), ∀i ∈ I, (4.3)
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−P¯Ll (1− δLl )(1− δIo(l))(1− δId(l)) ≤ PLl , ∀l ∈ L, (4.4)
PLl ≤ P¯Ll (1− δLl )(1− δIo(l))(1− δId(l)), ∀l ∈ L (4.5)
0 ≤ PGg ≤ P¯Gg (1− δGg ), ∀g ∈ G, (4.6)
dicδ
I
i ≤ Sic ≤ dic, ∀i ∈ I, c ∈ C, (4.7)
θi0 = 0. (4.8)
The objective function in (4.1) is the generation costs plus load-shedding
costs in $/h. Constraint (4.2) is linearized admittance constraints that approx-
imate active power flows on lines. Constraint (4.3) maintains power-balance
at the buses. Constraints (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6) set maximum power flows for
lines and maximum generating-unit outputs, respectively. Our current im-
plementation does not include contingency constraints, but these constraints
could be included.1 Constraint (4.7) ensures that load-shedding does not ex-
ceed demand. Constraint (4.8) sets the phase angle on the reference bus to
0.
1Under normal circumstances, power systems are operated to be secure with respect to
single contingencies. In the event of a terrorist attack, however, insecure operation might
be tolerated in order to serve as much load as possible.
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4.2 Integrated interdiction model
This section introduces the integrated interdiction model that consid-
ers both short and medium term implications of an attack. The “interdictor”
in our model, a group of terrorists, will make a coordinated set of resource-
constrained interdictions (attacks) on the power grid. Before detailed discus-
sion about the model, we state assumptions about the types of interdictions,
similar to [166] and [168]:
• Line interdiction: All lines running physically in parallel at the point of
an attack are opened. (Typically, these lines are mounted on the same
towers, and an attack on one is an attack on all.)
• Transformer interdiction: The line representing the transformer is opened.
• Generator interdiction: The generator is disconnected from the grid.
• Bus interdiction: All lines and generators connected to the bus are dis-
connected.
• Substation interdiction: All buses at the substation are disconnected;
this triggers the corresponding bus-interdiction effects just described.
We propose a new bi-level model:
max
δ∈∆
(z(δ) + ρy(δ)), (4.9)
s.t.
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Mδ ≤ M¯. (4.10)
where z(δ) corresponds to the medium-term total cost of I-DC-OPF
as discussed in previous section; ρy(δ) corresponds to the total short-term
load shedding cost subsequent to an interdiction specified by δ, where y(δ)
is the amount of load shedding evaluated by the Cascading Outage Analysis
(COA) model that was discussed in Chapter 2, and ρ is the load shedding
penalty cost. All decision variables in the vector δ are binary, M¯ is the total
terrorist resource (i.e. the number of terrorists), and entries in row vectorM
denote the number of resources required to interdict each of the system com-
ponents. Constraint (4.10) limits the total resources that terrorists use for the
interdiction plan to not exceed the resource limit M¯ . With this new bi-level
optimization model, both the medium-term and short-term “pain” after an
attack is addressed. In the actual implementation, several logical constraints
are added to speed convergence and to avoid re-evaluating interdictions con-
sidered in earlier iterations. These logical constraints are discussed in section
4.3.3.
The choice of the load shedding penalty costs ρ in (4.9) and qic in
(4.1) is crucial to the model2 because they are directly used to evaluate the
consequence of an attack δ. A higher medium-term load shedding penalty
2Our I-DC-OPF model is driven by generation and load shedding costs. However, load
shedding penalty costs qic are typically much higher than generation costs hg, so the load
shedding penalty, if any, will offset the generation cost.
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would lead to a choice of attack strategy to cause more medium-term shedding,
while a higher COA penalty would lead to a very different attack strategy
that causes more short-term load shed. On the one hand, more medium-term
load shedding will lead to a longer-lasting system “pain,” and the element
replacement/repair costs might be higher than short-term cascading outage
because most cascades are triggered by sequential system protection actions
that do not directly damage the facilities. On the other hand, however, the
short-term cascade, especially the total blackout, will be very noticeable and
widespread, which could cause intense attention from the public, or even panic
in society.
Note this interdiction model is a normative model based on assumptions
on the terrorists’ motivation, capability and resources. However due to the
rarity of the terrorist attacks and uniqueness of each attack, it may be hard
to produce the quantified inputs of this interdiction model. Therefore, other
descriptive models based on intelligence and historical data may also help the
ultimate decision on the defense schemes.
4.3 The heuristic algorithm to solve the integrated model
4.3.1 General Framework
Benders Decomposition (BD) [73], and Global Benders Decomposition
(GLBD) [168] could potentially be used to solve the bi-level optimization prob-
lem in (4.9) because they could guarantee convergence of the optimum, if
solved successfully. However they generally require construction of convexified
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“cuts,” which in our case is very difficult due to the non-linear, non-convex
nature of the cascading outage. Therefore, Benders Decomposition cannot be
directly used in our new formulation (4.9), and we use a heuristic algorithm
similar to that in [166] to solve the bi-level optimization problem described
above, whose framework is schematically shown in Figure 4.1.
Heuristic algorithms, such as proposed in [166], do not guarantee con-
vergence within a limited number of iterations, but could be solved relatively
easily, and provide “reasonable” or “near optimal” solution. Theoretically, the
heuristic will find the global optimum on or before the time when all feasible
solutions are evaluated. In fact, a general observation to the interdiction prob-
lem is that the more assets an attack interdicts, the more cost the system will
suffer. Therefore, the “worst case” attack strategy would most likely involve
as much resource as the terrorists have.
4.3.2 Subproblem: I-DC-OPF and COA for a given interdiction
plan
The initialization of the algorithm sets pre-attack coefficients and pre-
attack interdiction binary variables to be 0. At the n-th iteration, given an
interdiction plan δn that maximizes the master problem, we re-calculate the
I-DC-OPF model and COA model to obtain the new power flow patterns and
total cost z(δn) and y(δn), in which case we expect some load shedding cost
from I-DC-OPF and/or COA. The process continues by finding alternative sets
of valuable assets to interdict that have not been identified at earlier iterations,
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Figure 4.1: Proposed heuristic algorithm
and by evaluating load shedding of these interdiction plans.
4.3.3 Master Problem: Optimize a new interdiction strategy
The master problem uses the power flows from I-DC-OPF and COA
at the initial iteration to calculate estimated coefficients, V OPF and V COA,
and also calculates a set of the combined values of elements V Total used by
the integer programMP (V Total, δ
1, δ2, ..., δn) to solve for a newly optimized
attack plan δn+1 and the subsequent total costΦ(V , δn+1). The results of each
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iteration will be compared with the previous solutions and the “worst case”
plan will be updated. The coefficients for I-DC-OPF and COA are based on
the power flow values from I-DC-OPF and COA respectively. The calculation
for the values of each grid component in vector V OPF , for example, is shown
below:
VOPF,g = ϕ
GenPg, ∀g (4.11)
VOPF,l = ϕ
Line(|Pl|+
∑
l′∈LPar
l
|Pl′|), ∀l (4.12)
VOPF,i = ϕ
Bus(P Ini + P
Out
i ), ∀i (4.13)
VOPF,s = ϕ
Sub
∑
l|l∈Ls
|Pl|, ∀s (4.14)
The meaning of V OPF and V COA is to provide the “attractiveness”,
or the potential “benefit” of attacking each element, thus enabling the master
problem to determine the worst case attack strategy. As shown in (4.11)-
(4.14), calculation of the vectors V OPF and V COA is performed in a similar
fashion to [166], where the ϕ multipliers are constant coefficients reflecting
the relative value of interdicting each element, e.g., ϕGen = 2, ϕBus = 5,
ϕLine = 1, ϕSub = 5. After calculating V OPF and V COA, V Total is calculated
by V Total = V OPF ×̟OPF +V COA×̟COA. The values ̟OPF and ̟COA are
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the weights multiplied by the estimated vectors V OPF and V COA to send the
Master Problem the “incentives” to attack each component. Different values
of these weights will lead to different converging trajectory. For example, a
larger̟OPF will potentially make V OPF ×̟OPF larger than V COA×̟COA,
thus create a higher incentive for the MP to attack heavily post-OPF loaded
components. However, since the heuristic algorithm will ultimately choose the
“worst case” by the combined cost of I-DC-OPF and COA, the effect of̟OPF
and̟COA is primarily to affect the trajectory but not the best solution found
to (9). In our case, we choose: ̟OPF =̟COA = 0.5.
The combined and weighted power-flow pattern is then used to assign
relative values to all the interdictable components of the power grid. These
values are used to maximize the estimated value of the assets to be interdicted,
while ensuring that the terrorist resources required for the interdiction plan
are not exceeding the limit M¯ . Similar to section II.D in [166], we add five
inequality constraints as logical constraints to speed the solution process. The
meaning of these constrains are: do not interdict a bus i and a generator
connecting to the same bus at same time; do not interdict a line and its
terminal bus at the same time; do not interdict a line and its parallel line at
the same time; do not interdict a bus i and a substation that contains bus i at
the same time; and, do not interdict a line and the substation it is connected
to at the same time. Another logical constraint as described in section II.C
in [168] is also utilized to make sure the result of every iteration different from
the previous results. Hence the master problem formulation becomes:
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MP (V Total, δ
1, δ2, ..., δn):
max
δ
Line,δGen,δSub,δBus
∑
g∈G
Vgδ
Gen
g +
∑
l∈L
Vlδ
Line
l
+
∑
i∈I
Viδ
Bus
i +
∑
s∈S
Vsδ
Sub
s ,
s.t.
∑
g∈G∗
MGeng δ
Gen
g +
∑
l∈L∗
MLinel δ
Line
l
+
∑
i∈I∗
MBusi δ
Bus
i +
∑
s∈S
MSubs δ
Sub
s ≤ M¯,
∑
k∈K|δnˆ
k
=1
δnˆk +
∑
k∈K|δnˆ
k
=0
(1− δnˆk ) ≤ |K| − 1, ∀nˆ = 1, ..., n
δGeng + δ
Bus
i ≤ 1, ∀g ∈ G∗i , i ∈ I∗
δLinel + δ
Bus
i ≤ 1, ∀l ∈ Li
⋂
L∗, i ∈ I∗
δLinel + δ
Line
l′ ≤ 1, ∀l′ ∈ LParl
⋂
L∗, l ∈ L∗
δLinel + δ
Sub
i ≤ 1.∀l ∈ Ls
⋂
L∗, s ∈ S∗
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After obtaining this new attack plan δn+1 that solvesMP (V Total, δ
1, δ2, ..., δn),
the algorithm then goes back to the subproblem to check if it is the worst case
so far by comparing the combined cost of the load shedding due to δn+1 with
the cost of the previous worst case plan δ∗. The algorithm will iterate until
the master problem is infeasible, or the total number of iteration reaches the
pre-determined threshold N .
A more detailed, step by step description of this algorithm is shown as
follows:
Input Data:
· Problem statement data (grid data, interdiction resource)
· N Total number of iterations
Initialization:
· Set n = 1 (iteration counter) and vector δn to be zero.
· Φ∗ ← Φ0 Best interdiction plan initialized.
Solve Master problem:
· Calculate the vector of estimated values for I-DC-OPF model V OPF .
· Calculate the vector of estimated values for COA model: V COA.
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· Calculate the combined vector of DC-OPF and COA model: V Total =
V OPF ×̟OPF + V COA ×̟COA.
· Solve MP (V Total, δ1, δ2, ..., δn) for new interdiction plan δn+1.
· IfMP (V Total, δ1, δ2, ..., δn) is infeasible, STOP.
· Otherwise, assign n← n+ 1, go to Subproblem.
Solve Subproblem:
· Solve I-DC-OPF for total operation cost and potential load shedding
cost z(δn).
· Solve COA model for potential load shedding cost y(δn).
· Calculate the total disturbance cost Φ(δn) = z(δn) + ρy(δn).
· If Φ(δn) > Φ(δ∗) then Φ(δ∗)← Φ(δn).
· If n ≥ N then STOP.
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Chapter 5
Implementation, Results and Future Work
5.1 Implementation and Simulation Results
In order to implement the models and algorithms, a graphical user
interface is designed with the algorithm written in Visual Basic for Appli-
cation [132], PowerWorld Scripts [158], Excel Scripts [131], and Cplex [92].
Within the code, the graphical user interface (GUI) is designed using the Vi-
sual Basic for Application; the PowerWorld simulator is used in the I-DC-OPF
calculation, Transient Stability calculation, and the AC Power Flow calcula-
tion; Cplex is used to solve the integrated integer optimization problem; the
frequency checker algorithm, along with the high-level control algorithm is
implemented in Visual Basic for Applications.
With the GUI, the user will assign the attack resources, modify different
control settings with respect to the cascading outage analysis, and run the
interdiction model. The simulation result contains the post I-DC-OPF and
COA power flow patterns, the load shed for OPF and COA modules, and the
attack plan for each interdiction plan.
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5.1.1 IEEE Reliability Test System RTS-96 and Integrated Tool
Simulation
We have applied the proposed model and algorithm to 1996 IEEE Re-
liability Test System (RTS-96) [4]. Average simulation time for one iteration
is 8 to 10 seconds on a 2.5GHZ laptop computer with 4GB RAM, excluding
the initialization time that opens the solver connection and PowerWorld flow
case. We restrict the number of iterations to T = 500 for all problems to
limit the computation time. For a fixed interdiction resource M¯ as described
inMP (V Total, δ
1, δ2, ..., δn) to solve for a newly optimized attack plan δn+1,
the total simulation time is at most 1 hour, during which about 70 % of
the time is used to solve the master problem, 20% of the time is to perform
the cascading outage analysis and the I-DC-OPF calculations, and the rest
of the time is due to running interfaces among the tools. Within Cascading
Outage Analysis calculations, the time used for transient stability analysis is
about 50%, and the time used for other three checkers is about 50%. Since
we limited the number of iterations and computational time in this specific
experiment, the proposed heuristic may miss relevant solutions.
While the computational time seems to be high for such a small system,
the major increase of the computational burden for larger systems occurs in
solving a larger integer master program. The cascading outage analysis model
will run slower for large systems, but the computation time increases relatively
slowly (a COA without transient stability checker can run the size of ERCOT
system within 5 seconds). Solving the DC-OPF and running the interfaces are
64
also not contributing significantly further to the computational efforts. At the
same time, this “worst case” analysis is expected to be performed off-line so
that the computational burden would not be a major concern.
We applied the algorithm to RTS-96 test system for three scenarios. We
set the load shedding penalty cost for medium-term impacts to $1000/MWh
and set the short-term penalty to $1000/MW in scenario 1. We also simulated
two additional scenarios, each of which has one of the penalty costs dominating
the other.
5.1.2 Interdiction Results
Figure 5.1 displays the results from the algorithm for the amount of
load shed due to OPF, COA, and the total cost of the attack, respectively, in
scenario 1, with the interdiction resource M¯ varying from 0 to 22. Unlike in
Salmeron et al. [166], it is quite noticeable that the amount of I-DC-OPF load
shed is not monotonically non-decreasing. This is due to the effect of the jump
in COA load shedding from resource M¯ = 8 to M¯ = 10. At M¯ = 8 the system
will experience a comparably small cascading event, shedding 419MW of load,
roughly 14.7 % of the total load. Thereafter, if we increase the interdiction re-
source to M¯ = 10, the attack could possibly create a total cascading blackout,
meaning a total of 2850MW of load is shed, but only 765MW of load shedding
in I-DC-OPF. In this case, although the attack has a lower medium-term cost
compared with the previous attack, the total system cost is higher given our
choice of penalty coefficients. It can also be observed that the load shedding of
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Figure 5.1: Simulation Results on RTS-96 Test Case, scenario 1
the cascading outage is monotonically non-decreasing. At the same time, once
the resource is enough to trigger a total system blackout, more resources will
not increase the COA load shedding. Therefore, the consequence of having
more attack resources will be a higher medium-term load shedding only. In
general, the total cost of the attack is monotonically non-decreasing.
Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 display the simulation results of scenario 2
and 3. Scenario 2 has medium-term penalty cost of $1000/MWh and short-
term penalty of $0/MW. The results of scenario 2 are almost identical to the
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results in [166], which also only considers I-DC-OPF interdiction. Note that
the OPF load shed is non-decreasing when interdiction resource increases be-
cause no short-term impacts are contributing to the total impact evaluation.
High I-DC-OPF load shed with low cascading outage impact is primarily due
to relaxed emergency transmission loading in short-term operation compared
to sustained loading constraints in medium-term OPF. The results of sce-
nario 3 have medium-term penalty cost of $0/MWh and short-term penalty
of $1000/MW. It is demonstrated that although high cascading load shed is
achieved, lower I-DC-OPF cost may occur due to the ability to reschedule
power dispatch in I-DC-OPF.
5.1.3 Discussion
As mentioned in the Introduction, it is difficult to accurately under-
stand the objective of the terrorists. As can be seen from our results and
compared with the scenarios that only consider medium-term effects, such as
the results from [166], the terrorists generally need a relatively large amount
of resource to conduct an attack that results in large (e.g., larger than 80 %)
medium-term load disturbance, while the resources needed to achieve a large
short-term cascading events (e.g., cascading blackout) is much smaller. At the
same time, the short-term cascades might be more socially visible, meaning
a sudden large blackout would cause heavy media coverage. Therefore, each
operator should conduct the study based on its own forecast, or understanding
of the potential threats.
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Figure 5.2: Simulation Results on RTS-96 Test Case, scenario 2
5.2 Summary and Future Work
In this chapter, the completed work is summarized and the directions
of some future work are proposed. There are several limitations to our current
work, including that we do not consider the restoration of power grids; do
not consider cyber security threats to power system; the slow speed and poor
convergence capability; and the lack of study on comparison of interdiction
models and natural disaster analysis models. They are all important directions
that we would like to further investigate in our future work.
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Figure 5.3: Simulation Results on RTS-96 Test Case, scenario 3
5.2.1 Incorporate restoration and cyber security attack models
As indicated in [141], “perhaps the most serious vulnerability to the
various sensing, communication, and control subsystems that has developed
in recent years, and which is now being rapidly rectified, has been lack of
attention to connections from system control centers to the outside world. If
these connections are not treated with great care, and if proper cyber security
protection is not provided, they can in principle become a route for attackers
from the outside world to create disruption, take control, and cause damage.”
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Recent studies and simulations [175], [54] have revealed that multiple types
of attacks could be conducted to the power system through SCADA systems.
Most of the cyber-related attacks are aimed at disrupting the service of one or
more system components, either by physically destroying the physical facility,
or by shutting down the facility without physical harm. We are not trying
to study the detailed mechanisms of each attack, but rather our aim is to
study how to allocate the limited defense budget to strengthen the protection
against the critical components, which once attacked, could result in “worst
case” consequences.
Based on studies on the level of difficulties and consequences of the
attacks [175], we categorize the methods of attacks into four categories:
• Bomb or pure physical attack: the electric power facility (line, trans-
former, generator, bus, substation) is attacked and destroyed by attack-
ers physically carrying weapons to the scene. Such attacks involve explo-
sives and bomb attacks, etc and has been the default assumed method
of attack in the work developed so far.
• Hybrid attack: the electric power facility is attacked by attackers that
have to be physically near the scene, with the attackers gaining control of
the facility and stopping service without destroying it. Such attack tech-
niques include spoofing the PMU units that control a relay and opening
an associated circuit breaker. [183]
• Cyber attack, non-destructive: the electric power facility is attacked by
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remote attackers that stop the service of the facility without destroying
the asset. Such techniques include man-in-the-middle attacks, password
spoofing attacks, etc.
• Cyber attack, destructive: the electric power facility is attacked by re-
mote attackers that stop the service of the facility and destroy the asset.
Such techniques include gaining control and feeding false control com-
mand to over speed the generators as described in [175], etc.
The key difference among the attacks are not only the ways they are
conducted, but also the resources they need in order to be conducted, and the
resulting restoration time/cost. For example, Figure 5.4 shows some example
attack resource and repair times.1
Because of the large variation in the repair time among different attack
techniques described above, we need to incorporate the repair and restoration
cost to the model in order to get a better estimation of the attack consequence.
The interdiction model including repair and restoration has been investigated
in [166], [168]. In [166], a time-phased version of I-DC-OPF is created by
using interdiction constructs to couple instances of DC-OPF, one for each
system state that represents a stage or time period of system repair. Define
j = 1, 2, ..., J as the stages of the restoration, DURj as the time duration of
stage j (i.e. hours). For example, we may have up to 7 stages of the restoration
1The specific numbers are for example purposes only. We have performed what we think
are reasonable numbers but we do not currently have any specific empirical data.
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Name of 
attack
Target of attack Repair time Resource 
needed
Reference
scenario
Line attack 
(bomb)
Line Lab connecting 
bus a and b
Tbl,
e.g. 48 hours
Mbl,
e.g. 2
A bomb is carried to a transmission tower 
and explodes.
Line attack 
(hybrid)
Line Lab connecting 
bus a and b
Thl,
e.g. 8 hours
Mhl,
e.g. 2
The PMU controlling the relay of a breaker 
has its GPS spoofed (the action happens with 
terrorists close to the PMU) and PMU is 
controlled to open the breaker.
Line attack 
(cyber)
Line Lab connecting 
bus a and b
Tcl,
e.g. 6 hours
Mcl,
e.g. 1
The breaker is remotely controlled to open.
Gen attack 
(bomb)
Generator Gab
connecting bus a 
and b
Tbg,
e.g. 168 
hours
Mbg,
e.g. 8
A bomb is carried to a generator and 
explodes.
Gen attack 
(cyber, non-
destructive
Generator Gab
connecting bus a 
and b
Tcng,
e.g. 12 hours
Mcng,
e.g. 3
The generator is remotely controlled to be 
open.
Gen attack 
(cyber, 
destructive)
Generator Gab
connecting bus a 
and b
Tcdg,
e.g. 168 
hours
Mcdg,
e.g. 6
The generator is remotely controlled to over 
speed and breaks down.
Bus attack 
(bomb)
Bus Ba Tbbus,
e.g. 96 hours
Mbbus,
e.g. 6
A bomb is carried to a bus bar and explodes.
Substation 
attack (bomb)
Substation Sa Tbsub,
e.g. 168
hours
Mbsub,
e.g. 8
A bomb is carried to a substation and 
explodes.
Substation 
attack (cyber)
Substation Sa Tcsub,
e.g. 24 hours
Mcsub,
e.g. 8
The substation is remotely controlled to be 
shut down.
Figure 5.4: Description of modes of attack
based on repair time assumptions in Figure 5.4 (i.e. j = 1, 2, ...7). From hour 6
to hour 8, the damage of Line attack (cyber) is repaired, but all other damage
having repair time longer than 6 hours is not repaired (i.e. DUR2 = 2). The
model described in [166] can be expressed as:
max
δ∈∆
J∑
j=1
DURjzj(δ), (5.1)
s.t.
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Mδ ≤ M¯. (5.2)
Each instance DURjzj(δ) is an I-DC-OPF model with topology at
stage j. The topology is determined by the restoration process depending on
how many components are online and functional. During a particular stage of
restoration process (e.g. from hour 96 to hour 168 shown in Figure 5.4), the
topology is assumed to remain the same.
Based on the model described above, we propose an expanded interdic-
tion model considering the short term cascading effects and the sequencing of
restoration:
max
δ∈∆
(
J∑
j=1
DURjzj(δ)) + ρy(δ), (5.3)
s.t.
Mδ ≤ M¯. (5.4)
Expanding model (4.1),
∑J
j=1DUR
jzj(δ)g corresponds to the total
cost of multiple I-DC-OPF considering the restoration; ρy(δ) corresponds to
the total short-term load shedding cost subsequent to an interdiction specified
by δ, where y(δ) is the amount of load shedding evaluated by the Cascad-
ing Outage Analysis (COA) model that was discussed in Chapter 2, and ρ is
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the load shedding penalty cost. All decision variables in the vector δ are bi-
nary. Different from model (2.1), the decision variables include multiple attack
modes to each facility. Logically, only one attack mode should be applied to
one facility in a specific attack. The parameter M¯ is the total terrorist resource
(i.e. the number of terrorists), and entries in vectorM denote the number of
resources required to interdict each of the system components for each attack
mode. Constraint (7.2) limits the total resources that terrorists use for the
interdiction plan to not exceed the resource limit M¯ . The solution methods
are also similar to the heuristic algorithm discussed in chapter 5. This model
can be viewed as an extention of the integrated interdiction model (5.1) with
consideration of the cyber attacks and restoration.
Preliminary experiments have been done on IEEE RTS 96 system [4].
Using the parameters provided in Figure 5.4, with total resource M = 26, the
heuristic algorithm finds an attack scenario. The load shed over time is shown
in Figure 5.5,2 and the deployment of the attack resources is shown in Figure
5.6.
Future work includes more simulations, comparison with the scenarios
without cyber attacks, and more rigorous study of the mechanisms of the cyber
attacks.
2Note: durations of the repair stages shown in horizontal axis are not uniform.
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Figure 5.5: Load shed with time on RTS-96 Test Case, M=26
5.2.2 Improve the solution speed by new optimization methods
The limitations of this extension is that the computational burden be-
comes much higher than the models described in (2.1) and [166]. This is due
to a large increase of decision variables for multiple attack modes, and the
calculation of COA when compared to [166]. Therefore, we try to expedite
the heuristic algorithm. At the same time, the heuristic algorithm does not
guarantee the convergence of the problem. In [168], a “Global Benders De-
composition” algorithm has been used to solve the limitations discussed above.
The decomposition relies on a sequence of upper-bounding (i.e., optimistic
for the maximization problem) piecewise-linear functions for the interdictor’s
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Figure 5.6: The attack resource deployment on RTS-96 Test Case, M=26.
objective. The maximum of the pointwise minima of those functions must
converge to the optimal solution of IPF since only a finite number of interdic-
tion plans exist; however, practical use of the decomposition rests on verifiably
close-to-optimal solutions being found quickly.
In [168], for each interdiction plan δ, the interdictor’s objective z(δ) is
bounded by a cut:
z(δ) ≤ z(δˆ) +
∑
k∈K
αk(δˆ)(δk − δˆk), ∀δ, δˆ ∈ ∆ (5.5)
The cut is generated following an assumption:
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• Assumption: Ignoring the short-term load-shedding due to interdiction-
caused cascading failures, (a) the interdiction of a set of components,
each carrying p MW of power, leads to the shedding of at most p MW of
demand, and (b) the restoration of an interdicted component does not
increase load-shedding.
Although the assumption does not hold strictly, [168] has demonstrated
the efficiency and effectiveness of the method to solve interdiction problems.
The major difference of the interdiction model described in [166] compared
to the model in (7.1) is that we have short-term impacts, namely COA load
shedding costs added to the objective. Inspired by the cut (7.5), we propose
a new cut to tackle the inclusion of the short term COA cost:
z(δ) + ρy(δ) ≤ z(δˆ) +
∑
k∈K
αk(δˆ)(δk − δˆk) + ρ
∑
l∈L
Pl, ∀δ, δˆ ∈ ∆ (5.6)
In (7.6), we assume the upper bound of a potential cascading effect
is the total system blackout, and has a cost of ρ
∑
l∈L Pl. Future work will
focus on employing this cut structure to develop the extended Global Benders
Decomposition method, in order to expedite the solution process. Note the
assumption made in the proposed cut is likely to be conservative, because
given limited resource, an attack may not achieve a total system blackout or
load shedding that is close to the total system load. Therefore, the distance
between the actual “worst case” attack load shedding and the bound calculated
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by the right hand side of (7.6) may be large, which may create challenges for
the proper choice of convergence criteria.
In order to solve this challenge, we will also explore ways to establish
less conservative bounds. An example solution could involve a pre-screening
method (e.g. Random Chemistry method [62]) to identify whether the given
attack resource is sufficient to cause a total system blackout. If the attack
resource is sufficient to cause a system blackout, the upper bound described
in (7.6) may be appropriate. If the attack resource is not sufficient to case a
system blackout, a less conservative upper bound assumption may be applied
(e.g. multiples of the largest power flow on components).
5.2.3 Summary
In this chapter, the completed work and contribution is summarized.
The directions of some future work are proposed. We propose an extended
framework that considers the restoration of power grids and the cyber se-
curity threats to power system. We will apply an extended Global Benders
Decomposition cut structure and the subsequent screening methods to expe-
dite the solution process of the interdiction problem. We will also conduct
analysis on comparison of interdiction models and natural disaster models.
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Part IV
Power Grid Resilience under
Natural Disasters
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Chapter 6
Survey on Research of Power Grid Resilience
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is based on the author’s contribution in [218]. Dr. Chen
Chen, Dr. Jianhui Wang and Dr. Ross Baldick in [218] contributed to the
collection and discussion on the literature of the natural disasters research.
Secure and reliable electric power grid operation is important to social wellbe-
ing. Recent years have seen many blackouts due to natural disasters such as
the 2005 Hurricane Katrina blackouts, 2011 Japan Earthquake blackouts, and
2012 Hurricane Sandy blackouts. Between 2003 and 2012, roughly 679 power
outages, each affecting at least 50,000 customers, occurred due to weather
events in U.S. [64]. Hines et al [89] describes 933 events causing outages from
the years 1984 to 2006, and the data is presented in Table I1. The study of
natural disaster impacts on power grid can be traced back to 1930s, when
the 1938 New England Hurricane struck the Boston Area [79]. In the last
decades, there has been considerable progress in advancing methods for an-
alyzing natural disaster related issues in power systems. At the same time,
due to the complexity of the issue and its interdisciplinary nature, research
1The totals are greater than 100% because some events fall into multiple initiating-event
categories.
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Table 6.1: Large Blackouts Causes in the United States [89]
Cause % of events Mean size Mean size
in MW in customers
Earthquake 0.8 1,408 375,900
Tornado 2.8 367 115,439
Hurricane/tropical storm 4.2 1,309 782,695
Ice storm 5.0 1,152 343,448
Lightning 11.3 270 70,944
Wind/rain 14.8 793 185,199
Other cold weather 5.5 542 150,255
Fire 5.2 431 111,244
Intentional attack 1.6 340 24,572
Supply shortage 5.3 341 138,957
Other external cause 4.8 710 246,071
Equipment failure 29.7 379 57,140
Operator error 10.1 489 105,322
Voltage reduction 7.7 153 212,900
Volunteer reduction 5.9 190 134,543
activities are conducted sparsely across different domains. We summarize the
natural disaster characteristics based on multiple sources such as [77], [89] in
Table II. The research on the issue of natural disasters on power systems can
therefore be viewed in different aspects. To define the scope of this chapter, we
first summarize the timeline of the response in the electric grid under natural
disasters in Figure 6.1.
Paralleling the issues illustrated in Figure 6.1, we review the forecast
models that are used to estimate the power outages as well as the asset dam-
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Table 6.2: Illustration of disaster characteristics based on multiple sources
Type Impact Re-
gion
Predictability Span/area Affecting
time
Hurricane,
tropical
storm
Coastal re-
gions
24-72
hours,
moderate
to good
Large (ra-
dius up
to 1,000
miles)
Hours to
days
Tornado Inland
plains
0-2 hours,
bad to
moderate
Small (ra-
dius up to 5
miles)
Minutes to
hours
Blizzard,
Ice Storm
High lat-
itude
regions
24-72
hours,
moderate
to good
large, up to
1,000 miles
Hours to
days
Earthquake Regions on
fault lines
Seconds to
minutes,
bad
Small to
large
Minutes to
days (after-
shock)
Tsunami Coastal re-
gions
Minutes
to hours,
moderate
Small to
large
Minutes to
hours
Drought,
Wild Fire
Inland
regions
Days, good Medium to
large
Days to
months
ages; the corrective actions and emergency response, hardening and pre-storm
preparation models; the restoration models that organize activities happening
during or after the occurrence of the natural disasters. The scope of the work
does not consider meteorological or geographical analysis of the natural disas-
ters. While some traditional planning, operation and, restoration issues have
appeared in the literature, we try to select and discuss the models and meth-
ods that could be applicable and relevant to natural disaster scenarios. The
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Figure 6.1: Timeline of the response in electric grid under natural disasters
references we review are mainly academic, especially in forecast models, and
restoration techniques. On current hardening practices some of the references
are from industry. The models, methodologies, and frameworks we review
could be applied with no geographical restrictions. However, some examples
shown in this chapter are mostly US concentrated.
The remainder of this chapter is divided as follows. Section 6.2 re-
views the forecast models. Section 6.3 describes the experiences and practices
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for corrective actions, storm hardening programs, and pre-storm preparation
activities. Section 6.4 discusses the models used to advance restoration pro-
cesses. Section 6.5 provides challenges and suggestions for future work in the
area of natural disaster impacts on power systems.
6.2 Forecast Models
6.2.1 Statistical Models
A range of models have been proposed in the literature to model power
system damage, outage duration and restoration after natural disasters [138],
[120], [80], [78], [77]. Most of the proposed methods, however, rely on damage
assessments made after the occurrence of the extreme events [66], [148]. In this
section we discuss some of the frequently used datasets, models and validation
methods.2
6.2.1.1 Data and parameters
Many factors influence the susceptibility of electric power systems in a
given geographic area to outages during natural disasters. Data required for
statistical models can be divided into two categories, namely power system
data and environmental data. The power system data usually includes the
2Most of the existing models emphasize finding the explanatory factors in power outages.
While these factors and models could be used in both long-term hardening suggestions and
short-term forecasting before the natural disasters, the on-line applications of short-term
forecasting are challenging due to the difficulties to obtain update and validate real-time
data. At the same time, different models stated in this chapter may suit some purposes
better than the others. One example of the on-line prediction framework can be found
in [181].
84
location and number of the customers, topology of the system, availability
of the protection devices, etc.. The Transmission Availability Data System
(TADS) managed by North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
as well as its outage reports have collected outage data in a common format
for U.S. transmission systems [144]. Other reports [37], [59] also provide some
aggregated data for natural disasters.
Environmental data may vary with the disaster scenarios. Examples of
such parameters as well as the possible source are listed below:
• Land and geometric characteristics of the area such as land use and land
cover data, soil moisture levels, elevation characterisrics, land slopes,
compound topographic index [136], [208].
• Disaster variables such as hurricane duration and intensity, approaching
angle, landfall position, translation velocity, etc [142].
• Climatic characteristics, such as standardized precipitation index (SPI),
annual and monthly precipitation [143].
6.2.1.2 Data fitting models
Generalized Linear Models (GLM): GLM has been used in [77], [78] to
estimate the storm damage to power systems and the effects of tree trimming
programs on power systems resiliency under hurricanes. For example, [78]
used a negative binomial GLM to model power system failures, represented by
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equations (6.1) and (6.2):
fY (y|α, λ) ∼ Γ(yi + α)
Γ(yi + 1)Γ(α−1)
×
(
α−1
α−1 + λi
)α−1 (
λi
α−1 + λi
)
, (6.1)
log(λi) = β0 +
∑
i
βixi, (6.2)
where the vector xi represents the explanatory variables, the vector β is the
regression parameters to be estimated, and α is the overdispersion param-
eter of the negative binomial distribution that is observed in power system
performance data.
Generalized Additive Models (GAM): The structure of a GAM differs
from the structure of a GLM only in how the parameters of the conditional
distribution are related to the covariates. For example, the link function shown
in equation (6.2) can be changed to equation (6.3) to represent a non-linear
smoothing function.
log(λi) = β0 +
∑
i
s(xi) (6.3)
Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) models: AFT models have been used
by [138], [120] to estimate the power outage durations. The model relates the
survival time to the explanatory variables through a linear relationship, as
shown in equation (6.4):
ln(Ti) = X
T
t β + σi (6.4)
where Ti is the survival time random variable, Xi is the vector of covariates,
β is the vector of parameters, and σi is the vector errors that is assumed to
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be independently distributed. AFT is most typically fit using the method of
maximum likelihood.
Tree Based Data Mining models (Classification And Regression Trees
(CART) and Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART model)) [138]: CART
are built by binary splitting of the data space into terminal nodes. In building
regression trees the best splits s are chosen such that the sum of squared
errors (or least absolute deviation) within each node t is minimized. A BART
model comprises a set of small trees with each tree constrained by a prior to
restrict each tree’s contribution to the final model, making each individual tree
a “weak learner”. Fit and inference in BART are achieved through a Markov
chain Monte Carlo algorithm.
Some other methods including Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) [122], Mul-
tivariate Adaptive Regression Splines method (MARS) and Cox Proportional
Hazard models (COX PH) have also been used in the statistical forecast of
the natural disaster impacts on power systems.
6.2.1.3 Measurement of fitting goodness and example
A typical way to measure the fitting goodness of a certain model is
to compare the prediction results with the observed data. The mean absolute
error (MAE), mean absolute deviation (MAD), mean squared error (MSE), and
root mean squared error (RMSE) are often used as metrics to this comparison.
An example of the model implementation can be found in [78], where
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Table 6.3: Comparison of Holdout Mean Absolute Errors (MAEs)
Model MAE
BART 11.5
CART 11.7
GLM 21.4
GAM 13.6
BART/CART 10.3
BART/CART/GAM 10.4
BART/CART/GAM/GLM 12.0
Prediction by the Mean 20.0
model validation has been performed across four basic models, namely BART,
CART, GLM, and GAM, as well as a combination of the methods to assess
the pre-storm estimation of number of damaged poles in a distribution system.
The variables used in the example include the parameters in Chapter 6.2.1.1).
The pole replacement data consisted of the number of poles that were replaced
in 456 grid cells (12,000 feet by 8,000 feet) due to damage in parts of Missis-
sippi during Hurricane Katrina. There were 8,698 total pole replacements in
this data set with 2,308 of these being poles owned by a telephone company
but used by the power company and 6,390 being poles owned by the power
company. The Comparison of Holdout Mean Absolute Errors (MAEs) based
on detailed pole-level damage data on the basis of 150 random pre-selected
samples (or “holdout” samples) is provided in Table 6.3.
88
6.2.2 Simulation Based Models
While most of the forecast models for power outages use statistical anal-
ysis, the accuracy of the estimates of the statistical approaches are critically
dependent on (1) the appropriateness of the model used and (2) the sufficiency
of the underlying data [138]. If an inappropriate or inappropriately developed
model is used or if the data are insufficient to support the model development
effort, the predictive accuracy of the statistical approach will be poor. At the
same time, climate changes and other variances in natural occurrence could
deviate the prediction results further from the future reality. Therefore, there
is a value to understand the physical mechanisms of the damage, build simu-
lation models that replicate the disaster occurrence and system response, and
determine the proper preparation and hardening procedures.
One of the major causes of the equipment failures in natural disas-
ters is due to the impacts of wind on transmission and distribution structures.
There is a wide literature discussing the models and design of transmission and
distribution structures subject to wind loading [171], [130], [81], [190], [68].
When designing transmission towers with conventional geometries and con-
ductor arrangements the engineer has some design codes and guides avail-
able [139], [94], [205].
A simulation based approach to estimate the power outages or natu-
ral disaster related asset damages has been in [214] and an illustration of the
approach is shown in Fig. 6.2. The core of the framework is the simulator
that consists of (1) hurricane models, which associates the weather forecast
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parameters with the estimation of local environment for each power system
components; (2) a set of generated initial disturbance following the hurricane
models3; (3) a system outage simulator (Cascading Outage Analyzer) that
evaluates the system condition following the initial disturbances. The output
of the simulator could be system conditions such as power outages and dam-
aged assets, as well as a series of hardening suggestions that help utilities to
identify critical assets.
Numerous hurricane, transmission failure and outage models have been
used in the previous research demonstrated in Fig. 6.2. [37], [214]. The sim-
ulation tool has the inputs of available weather forecast information, such as
the landing positions, approaching angle, translation velocity, central pres-
sure difference, maximum wind speed, and gust factor, to feed in to sample
a failure rate-wind speed curve that generates the failed transmission line in-
formation as initial disturbances. This sampling processes can be replicated
in a Monte-Carlo simulation framework. The initial disturbances, i.e. a set of
failed transmission lines, are used in a developed Cascading Outage Analyzer,
to produce the outage data under such a forecasted scenario. The hardening
decisions are made to upgrade the most frequently observed outage paths.
We have developed a model based on this framework for hurricane
impact simulation. The details of the model is discussed in Chapter 7.
3Many transmission and distribution failure models are developed by the statistical mod-
els or observations in Section 6.2.1
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Figure 6.2: Example simulation framework for hurricane outage forecast
6.3 Corrective Actions, Hardening and Resiliency Ac-
tivities
We define the corrective actions and emergency response as actions
that are deployed during and right after natural disasters. When the natural
disaster happens, due to the severity and uncertainty of the event, few cor-
rective actions and emergency response actions are currently being deployed
by utilities. Several papers discuss traditional measures to prevent large scale
blackouts due to “multiple contingencies,” which could potentially be used to
help immediate natural disaster relief. Such activities may include deployment
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of Special Protection Schemes [210], [209] and Islanding Schemes [65], [213].
According to U.S. Department of Energy [206], hardening refers to
physically changing the infrastructure to make it less susceptible to damage
from extreme wind, flooding, or flying debris. Resiliency refers to the ability
of an energy facility to recover quickly from damage to any of its components
or to any of the external systems on which it depends. A summary of the
existing practices to harden and increase resiliency of electric transmission
and distribution system is shown in table 6.4.
Among the activities, elevating Substations, upgrading and under-grounding
existing lines, and vegetation management are commonly used in current util-
ity programs. We show some of the examples reported by the utilities in the
following section.
Example 1: To prevent future flooding, as part of Southwest Louisiana
Electric Membership Corporation’s hardening plan, three substations that
were flooded by Hurricanes Rita and Ike were elevated above the storm surge
plus five feet, for a total of 13 feet above sea level. The cost of elevating the
three substations was estimated at $5.2 million [206].
Example 2: To upgrade and harden the T&D lines against high wind,
the public utility council of Texas (PUCT) has recommended that all new and
replacement transmission structures installed within ten miles of the Texas
coastline be designed to meet the current NESC (National Electric Safety
Code) wind loading standards, assuming a maximum wind speed of 140 mph.
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Table 6.4: Power Grid Hardening and Resiliency Activities [206]
Hardening Activities
Flood Protection Elevating Substations/control rooms/pump stations
Relocating/constructing new lines and facilities
Wind Protection Upgrading damaged poles and structures
Strengthening poles with guy wires
Burying power lines underground
Modernization Deploying sensors and control technology
Installing asset databases/tools
Resiliency Activities
General Readiness Conducting preparedness planning and training
Complying with inspection protocols
Managing vegetation
Participating in mutual assistance groups
Purchasing/leasing mobile transformers and substations
Procuring spare T&D equipment
Storm-Specific Facilitating employee evacuation and reentry
Readiness Securing emergency fuel contracts
Supplying logistics to staging areas
For 2009, Tampa Electric budgeted $10.7 million to replace 584 structures with
steel or concrete poles, and 99 sets of insulators with polymer replacements
[70]. Strengthening poles and towers by installing guy wires and upgrading
crossarm materials is another common hardening method. Guying for extreme
winds can cost $1,500 - $3,100 per pole [206].
According to [159], The estimated cost for constructing underground
transmission lines ranges from 4 to 14 times more expensive than overhead
lines of the same voltage and same distance. For example, a new 138 kV
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overhead line costs approximately $390,000 per mile as opposed to $2 million
per mile for underground (without the terminals) [159].
Tree trimming is also the primary way that trees near distribution lines
are managed [103]. In 2006, NERC introduced the Transmission Vegetation
Management Program (Standard FAC-003-1) [145]. There are a number of pa-
pers discussing the vegetation maintenance scheduling models and techniques
of overhead lines [103], [12], [228], [98], [95]. While these models do not di-
rectly consider natural disaster scenarios, they may be helpful for utilities to
determine optimal strategy to allocate hardening resources.
Preparation of sufficient emergency generation units and black start
units also plays a critical role in case of natural disasters. Generation plan-
ning does not normally consider the benefit of providing blackstart power and
reduction of restoration time in natural disasters. However, optimal allocation
of blackstart units and restoration procedure has been studied in [119] [193].
Such planning activities could significantly reduce the system restoration time,
thus enhance the system resiliency.
6.4 Power System Restoration Techniques
After a power outage happens due to the damage from a natural dis-
aster, the most important task for system operators is to restore the power
system as quickly as possible to restore critical loads and minimize the eco-
nomic loss to customers. In this section, we will first review the conventional
power system restoration strategies and discuss new challenges for restoration
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from natural disasters. Then we will discuss two strategies to tackle these chal-
lenges, i.e., distributed generation and microgrids integration, and distribution
automation with decentralized restoration.
6.4.1 Conventional Restoration Strategies
Power system restoration methods have been studied extensively in
the literature [14] [115]. In general, the restoration process can be divided
into three temporal stages: preparation, system restoration, and load restora-
tion [69] [15]. In the first stage, the system status is assessed, initial cranking
sources are identified and critical loads are located. During the second stage,
the overall goal is reintegration of the bulk power network by designing an
optimal generator start-up strategy utilizing black start (BS) and non-black
start (NBS) units. Mathematical programming provides a powerful tool to
tackle this problem, e.g. [119] [193]. In the third stage, the primary objective
of restoration is to restore critical loads and minimize the unserved load, and
the scheduling of load pickup will be based on the capabilities of available
generators. This stage takes place after a part of the transmission system has
been restored and electrical parameters such as frequency and voltage profile
have been stabilized. Several approaches and analytical tools have been devel-
oped for load restoration strategies such as: expert systems [118] [48], fuzzy
logic [114] [109], heuristic approaches [135] [201], and mathematical program-
ming [97] [153] [152]. With emerging smart grid technologies, phasor measure-
ment units (PMUs) based wide area monitoring system (WAMS) can enhance
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the information transmission as well as the system stability monitoring in the
load restoration process [121].
However, power outages due to natural disasters have their unique fea-
tures, which are different from those in typical outages, as shown in Table 6.5.
These features are highly related to the characteristics of the natural disasters.
For example, a storm may topple trees at several locations that snap utility
poles to cause multiple faults causing a wide spreading outage, and these lo-
cations are dependent on the path of the storm, while in a typical outage,
usually only one random fault causes the outage. Some severe disasters can
even damage the transmission network, substations and generators, so that
conventional restoration methods may not work effectively. In addition, natu-
ral disasters may also destroy other infrastructures which are interdependent
with power grids (e.g., transportation, communications, water) so that the
restoration will face even more difficulties. In comparison, a typical power
outage usually does not have such issues. In this sense, conventional power
system restoration strategies, which are designed for typical outages, may have
more challenges for the recovery from outages as a result of natural disasters.
To cope with these challenges, new techniques, such as distributed
generation, microgrids, distribution automation, and decentralized restora-
tion strategies, may provide promising solutions to enhance the resilience of
the grids, which will be in the following section. A few existing works have
been done, e.g., using microgrids for system restoration after natural disasters,
which will also be described.
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Table 6.5: Differences between typical outages and natural disaster related
outages
Typical Outages Outages due to Natural Disasters
• Single fault due to one component
failure
• Multiple faults due to catastrophic
damage
• No stocastic feature involved in gen-
eral analysis
• Uncertainty and stochasticity with
the process of natural disasters
• No spatiotemporal correlation for the
fault; fault happens randomly
• Spatiotemporal correlation for the
faults due to natural disasters
• Most power generation units are
working and stay connected
• Power generation units may be out of
service
• Transmission and distribution net-
work remain intact
• Transmission and distribution net-
work are damaged and incomplete
• Only involve power grids infrastruc-
ture
• Have interdependence with other in-
frastructures
• Quickly repair and restore • Difficult to repair and restore, e.g.,
debris after the disaster
6.4.2 DGs and Microgrids for Load Restoration
Generation availability is fundamental for all stages of power system
restoration: stabilizing the system, establishing the transmission path, and
picking up load [119]. As shown in Table 6.5, the lack of power availabil-
ity during outages due to natural disasters casts huge challenges for conven-
tional restoration strategies, which are based on the condition that most power
sources are working and stay connected. To cope with generation unavailabil-
ity during and after the natural disaster, distributed generation units (DGs)
can be utilized to enhance the grid resilience by improving generation availabil-
ity (e.g., fuel cells, microturbines, wind turbines, photovoltaic panels) [155].
Furthermore, microgrids can be employed to efficiently manage these DGs as
97
well as other resources to improve the restoration for natural disasters. A mi-
crogrid is a small-scale power system typically on the medium- or low- voltage
distribution feeder that includes distributed load and generation together with
storage (e.g., flywheels, batteries) and protection devices, which are synchro-
nized through an embedded management and control system [123] [220] [221].
Fig. 6.3 is a typical architecture of the microgrid that comprises different kinds
of components [123].
Figure 6.3: Microgrid architecture comprising microsources, storage devices,
loads and control devices [123]
A key fundamental difference of microgrids with respect to conven-
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tional grids is that microgrids add active network components (i.e., DGs) at
the distribution level, which provide more operational flexibility and reduce
conventional power grid vulnerabilities caused by centralized generation and
control architecture and long distances between power sources and loads [104].
This feature is even more important for the power system restoration after
natural disasters. In addition, the observed uneven damage distribution of the
natural disaster on distribution systems increase the resilience when applying
microgrids for load restoration, as the chances of all microgrids being damaged
are very low [104]. In this sense, microgrids will enhance the power system
restoration after the disastrous event. The value of microgrids to achieve grid
resilience has been recognized, and they are being adopted by some state gov-
ernments and industries, and their technical, regulatory, and financial barriers
for implementations are being studied, e.g., [9] [8].
Three specific uses of microgrids in power restoration are discribed in
the following sections:
6.4.2.1 Microgrids aiding the conventional load restoration
In this scenario, the microgrids can serve as extra resource to enhance
the conventional load restoration. This is especially useful for the area where
no other suitable restoration path or source are available. In [112], the authors
proposed graph-theoretic distribution system restoration strategy to embed
the emerging microgrids that enhance the self-healing capability and allow the
distribution system to recover faster in the event of an outage. The proposed
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method applies the spanning tree search algorithm to maximize the restored
load and minimizes the number of switching operations without violations of
operational constraints. The microgrids in the distribution system are modeled
as virtual feeders. The authors in [133] presents a mathematical model to
utilize microgrids to alleviate the outage in the absence of suitable restoration
path/source.
6.4.2.2 Microgrids providing resources for bulk system restoration
In this scenario, the microgrids operate in the grid-connected mode, and
can provide ancillary services such as blackstart to the bulk system restora-
tion. For example, the authors in [42] developed a stochastic mixed integer
linear program to assess the impact of coordinating microgrids as a blackstart
resource to the regional grid or Regional Transmission Organization (RTO)
after a natural disaster.
6.4.2.3 Microgrids in island mode for load restoration
In this scenario, the microgrids act in island mode in the event of disas-
ters and serve critical loads like data center, hospital communities, and cam-
puses by utilizing local generation and storage facilities. This operation mode
requires special control for the frequency and voltage since no support is from
the main grids. The power electronics inverters in this case act as voltage
source inverter (VSI) to control the frequency and voltage [123]. In [134], the
authors described the sequence of actions for a microgrid central controller
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(MGCC) to perform service restoration, which is briefly described as the fol-
lowing steps: 1) sectionalize the microgrid around each microsource (MS) with
BS capability; 2) build the low voltage (LV) network utilizing storage device; 3)
synchronize small islands energized by MS; 4) connect the controllable loads to
the LV network; 5) connect noncontrollable MS or MS without BS capability;
6) connect other loads; 7) change the control mode of MS inverters; 8) syn-
chronize the microgrid with the medium voltage network. In [163], the authors
further proposed a new distribution system architecture that allows the coordi-
nation among multiple microgrids for load restoration, and the corresponding
sequence of actions are defined. Reference [74] the role of electric vehicles
(EVs) as grid-supporting units to take advantage of their storage capacity and
charging flexibility in the microgrids restoration. In [47], the authors pro-
posed a microgrids formation scheme by utilizing the distributed generation
to restore the critical loads after the natural disaster. Reference [222] pro-
posed a self-healing strategy after natural disasters by sectionlization of the
distribution system into microgrids. Other regional experiences such as shown
in [170], [187] and [234] can also be utilized.
These three functions for power system restoration can be integrated
in the microgrid energy management system (EMS). In [46], the authors in-
troduce the hierarchical control of the Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT)
microgrid, in which primary control is based on droop characteristics of dis-
tributed energy resources for the sharing the microgrid load; secondary control
performs corrective action to mitigate frequency and voltage errors introduced
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by droop control; tertiary control manages the flow between the microgrid and
the utility grid and provides normal operation as well as emergency restoration
services.
6.4.3 Advanced Distribution Automation Techniques and Decen-
tralized Restoration Strategies
Current power distribution systems are mostly operated under radial
topology and limited number of line switches. However, to improve the relia-
bility of distribution system, network topology with a large number remotely
controlled automatic switches will be implemented [87]. With the Smart Grid
Investment Grant (SGIG) by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) under the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, several utilities have in-
stalled a large number of remotely controlled switches to enhance the topology
flexibility of the distribution system, so called distribution automation [207].
These distribution automation pilot projects largely increase the reliability
(e.g., System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) and System Av-
erage Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) of the distribution system [207],
by reducing the number of customers affected and the restoration time. Dur-
ing the restoration after the natural disaster, distribution automation can be
extremely helpful since several distribution lines may be destroyed due to
the disaster. Reconfiguration of the topology of the network with remotely
controlled switches provides opportunities to restore the outaged loads more
quickly. This flexibility can also enhance the integration of distributed gen-
eration and storage, i.e., microgrids, into the distribution system for restora-
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tion. The authors in [155] proposed a method for integration of large scale
of distributed generation into power system restoration by utilizing the fully
implementation of remotely controlled switches.
Generally, the approaches to study service restoration in the distribu-
tion system can be roughly grouped into two categories: centralized methods
and distributed methods [111]. The centralized methods normally depend on
a powerful central facility to handle large amount of data with high com-
munication capability requirement. This dependency is not suitable for next
generation resilient distribution system in two aspects. Firstly, large amount
of remotely controlled devices installed in the system would be an extensive
burden on computation and communication will exert on the central controller.
Secondly, the centralized strategy is prone to a single-point-of-failure of the
central controller, especially in the scenario of the natural disaster. In this
sense, decentralized power system restoration strategies, or the construction
of multiple back-up control centers are needed to achieve grid resilience.
Several decentralized methods have been proposed for the power sys-
tem restoration in the literature, e.g., [188] [146] [226] [162] [235], and they are
based on multi-agent coordination schemes. In [188], a multi-agent system for
load restoration is proposed, where description of the types of agents and their
behaviors to exchange information and determine a feasible restoration path
is specified. The authors in [226] proposed a distributed information discov-
ery process for load restoration applying the average consensus algorithm, in
which agents only communicate with their direct neighbors. In [146], the au-
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thors proposed a distributed algorithm for service restoration with distributed
energy storage support following fault detection, location and isolation, as well
as load restoration. The authors in [162] presented a conceptual multi-agent
system design for autonomous bulk power system restoration. A dynamic
team forming mechanism was proposed for agent coordination purposes. The
authors in [235] proposed a cooperative two-layer multi-agent system to locate
and isolate faults and decide and implement the switch operations to restore
the out-of-service loads. Besides these research work, the decentralized meth-
ods have already been implemented in some distribution automation products,
e.g., [172] [76]. With the decentralized methods, these remotely controlled au-
tomatic switch devices of distribution automation can achieve more resilient
power system restoration scheme to mitigate the impact of natural disasters
on customers.
6.5 Conclusion and Future Research Directions
This chapter reviewed the state-of-the-art of the impacts of natural dis-
asters on power systems, and how the advanced smart grid technologies can
be utilized to enhance the grid resilience. Due to the complexity of the issue,
it involves interdisciplinary techniques such as statistics, meteorology, power
engineering, optimization, communication and control, as well as policies and
regulations. Based on the review, we observe several challenges and opportu-
nities in future research, and this chapter lists three important directions in
the next section.
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6.5.1 Interdependence among Different Infrastructures
As discussed in Table 6.5, during a natural disaster, the resilience of the
power system does not solely depend on the infrastructure of the power grids,
but is also related to other infrastructures such as communication network,
natural gas pipelines, transportation network, etc. For example, distributed
generation such as internal combustion engine generator or microturbines will
not work if the fuel or natural gas availability (also called lifeline infrastruc-
tures [104]) are destroyed by the natural disaster. To achieve a resilient power
system, these lifeline infrastructures should be considered in the overall plan-
ning and operation before and after the natural disaster.
To do so, the impacts of lifeline infrastructures on the power system
regarding the natural disaster need to be analyzed first. Several papers in the
literature have already analyzed the interdependence between the power grids
and natural gas infrastructure in the normal operation [178] [116]; however,
the extension of these interdependence analyses from a resilience perspective
has not been well studied. The co-simulation framework for the interdepen-
dent infrastructure is useful to evaluate the correlation between them. For
example, based on the assessment, the optimization problem for planning of
the infrastructure considering these dependencies can be formulated, in which
the uncertainty of the infrastructure subject to the natural disaster can be
integrated using stochastic or robust optimization techniques. At the opera-
tion level, optimal strategies utilizing the flexibility of the infrastructure (e.g.,
reconfiguration of network topology, demand response, distributed energy stor-
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age) can be designed using optimization techniques.
6.5.2 Operation and Control for Power System Restoration with
DGs, Microgrids, and Distribution Automation
Integrating microgrids and distribution automation provide potential to
improve the restoration process of the power system; however, challenges exist
on the operation and control of the distributed generation and the remotely
controlled switch devices to achieve the restoration goal while maintaining the
frequency and voltage profile of the distribution system, especially in the island
mode of the microgrids. During the disaster, the distributed generation and
the remotely controlled switches may also be fully or partially damaged, so
operation and control under this stringent condition need to be considered.
Advances in distributed optimization techniques [100] can be utilized
to design the decentralized restoration scheme which is suitable for the natural
disaster scenario. The impact of the device failure can be analyzed based on
this decentralized framework which serves as the tertiary control level. The
coordination between this scheme and primary and secondary control scheme
need to be investigated accordingly.
6.5.3 Natural Disaster Impact Forecast, Hardening and Resilience
Optimization
There lacks a clear link from the modeling of damages/outages to the
future prediction and hardening guidance. The statistical methods described
in section 6.2.1 heavily relies on the information that is localized (meaning
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heavily associated with the local geographies and power system structure)
and subject to a specific event. Such case-dependent variance and uncertainty
prevent the use of the model for future predictions. At the same time, the sta-
tistical methods do not look into the mechanisms of the development process
of the blackouts/damages. Simulation based models may be able to provide
more insights into causes of outages. But they are substantially more com-
plex when detailed power system transmission and distribution information, as
well as the other factors (e.g. vegetation information, accurate wind forecast,
etc) are required. Such requirements may be hard to obtain, and subject to
uncertainties.
When designing the hardening and resilience programs, utilities typi-
cally do not use systematic and rigorous optimization techniques. A common
way of deploying the investment is to upgrade the previously damaged facil-
ities, or choose certain techniques based on experience. Therefore, the iden-
tification and allocation of the budget may not be the most efficient. More
research on how to optimize the hardening program investments could poten-
tially save a large amount of money, as well as increase the resilience of the
program. Some optimization methods and applications in the conventional
power system research, such as [103], [12], [228], [98], [95] may be a helpful
starting point.
Future research on forecast models is needed in two direction: 1) Es-
tablish models that links the forecast and the hardening investment guidance.
For example, [37] provided some insights on the cost-benefit analysis of the in-
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frastructure upgrades based on increasing NESC standard requirements. Such
analysis may also be used in other types of hardening techniques, guided by
the more accurate statistical and simulation models. 2) Enhancing the accu-
racy of the forecast by developing new statistical and simulation based models.
This may require more data analytical models to be incorporated, as well as
more open source data to be provided by the utilities. As discribed in section
6.2.2, we developed a tool to analyze power system security under hurricane
threats based on the framework proposed in Figure 6.2. In the next chapter,
this tool will be discussed in detail.
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Chapter 7
Tool to Analyze Power System Security under
Hurricane Threats
7.1 Introduction
This chapter is based on author’s contribution in [214]. This chapter
presents the efforts that aim to create a tool to analyze the power system
security and safety under severe weather conditions such as hurricanes. The
tool will be constructed in two parts, Cascading Outage Analyzer, and the
Hurricane Model Generator. Further discussions on the potential applications
to natural disaster relief and preparation are also provided. The schemes
described in the chapter could be adopted by the utilities to reduce the costs
of natural disasters, and increase the efficiency of the grid operation. While we
try to represent what is happening in a hurricane event as accurate as possible,
there are still a lot of assumptions and approximations in terms of modeling.
Some of these assumptions and approximations are conservative to assess the
consequence, while others are not. For example, considering the whole south
and Houston zone lines under same wind condition certainly creates more
severe results than reality, because the wind speed will not be maximum at
each location at the same time; on the other hand, not considering the effects
of storm surge and the subsequent substation/generator damage makes the
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results optimistic. Those issues should be acknowledged before applying the
results.
7.2 General Framework
The tool to identify and analyze the hurricane threats to the power
systems has a general framework as shown in Figure 6.2, which is repeated
in Figure 7.1. The objective is to use the published and available weather
forecast information, such as the landing positions, approaching angle, trans-
lation velocity, central pressure difference, maximum wind speed, and gust
factor, to feed in to a hurricane model that generates the failed transmission
line information as initial disturbance. The initial disturbance, i.e. a set of
failed transmission lines, are used in developed Cascading Outage Analyzer, to
produce the potential system conditions under such forecasted scenario, and
the subsequent hardening suggestions.
7.3 Hurricane Model
As discussed in the general framework, it is vital to translate the avail-
able weather forecast information, to the actual projections of what trans-
mission lines might experience outage during the event. Numerous stud-
ies [37], [224], [101], [124], [110] have been done to explain the relationship
between high intensive wind (HIW) and the failure of transmission structure.
The National Electric Safety Code [139] has set an “extreme wind loading”
design criteria to the structures higher than 18 meters (60 ft.) above ground
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Figure 7.1: The general framework for hurricane outage forecast tool
or water. As most transmission line structures exceed this height, the extreme
wind loading criteria is currently required for new construction in extreme
wind regions. The report from Quanta Technologies [37] has identified the
damage data from utilities and failure rate modeling produced the failure rate
curve for existing structures, shown in Figure 7.2. The failure rate y as a
function of gust speed x is:
y = 2 ∗ 10−7e0.0834x (7.1)
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Figure 7.2: Failure rate of existing transmission lines
These data are based on existing transmission structures under NESC
Grade B requirements and are equivalent to a wind loading standard of 105
mph. If the structures are replaced or rebuilt to the current NESC extreme
wind loading criteria, they would need to meet a wind load requirement of up
to 130 mph. The failure rate curve based on 130 mph design for transmission
structure is shown in Figure 7.3. The failure rate y as a function of gust speed
x is:
y = 2 ∗ 10−8e0.0834x (7.2)
Note that the unit of the failure rate in the figures is not identified
in [37] and the authors of this study were not available to clarify. We assume
that the failure rate is intended to be probability of failure per structure per
hurricane event. At the same time, the focus of this chapter is not to accurately
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Figure 7.3: Failure rate of hardened transmission lines
estimate the failure rates of transmission structure under hurricanes, and we
suggest every entity that is trying to use the tool needs to identify the failure
rates of its transmission structures under certain wind speed. In modeling the
transmission failure, several assumptions are stated as below:
• For a transmission line with multiple transmission structures, i.e., trans-
mission towers, the failure of one of the transmission structure will lead
to a trip of the transmission line.
• The failures of the transmission structures by wind are assumed to be
independent. Notice once a transmission tower has failed, it is likely
that the conductor attached to the transmission tower drags the towers
next to the failed tower and induce subsequent failures. This will affect
the calculation of the restoration, but will not affect the assessment of
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probability of one transmission line failure, because once the initial fail-
ure occurs, the whole transmission line is assumed out of service. For a
transmission line with n transmission structures, and failure rate of each
transmission structure y1, y2, ...yn, the failure rate of the transmission
line will be yline = sum
i=n
i=1yi.
• The failure of the transmission structures is assumed to be a Poisson
process, according to the exponential failure law. [31] The mean value of
the time to failure, Tf , is E{Tf} = 1y . The probability density function
(PDF) of the time to failure is given in equation 7.3, and the cumulative
density function (CDF) of the time to failure is given in equation 7.4.
fTf = yline ∗ e−ylinet, t ≥ 0, (7.3)
FTf(t) = 1− e−ylinet, t ≥ 0. (7.4)
• The hurricane event is divided into several time frames, e.g., fifty 5-
minute time windows. For one time window, e.g., 5 minutes, the gust
speed is assumed to be constant; therefore, the failure rate of the trans-
mission line within the time window is constant. Once a transmission
line is failed, it will not be restored within the hurricane event.
After the assumptions are made, for each simulated hurricane scenario,
a sample of the transmission line failures is created by the steps 1 to 5 described
below:
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• Step 1: Acquire the weather forecast (e.g., sustained wind speed) and
calculated gust wind speed at each location for an observation time win-
dow, e.g. the first 5 minutes of the hurricane.
• Step 2: Use equation 2 or 3 to find the failure rate of each transmis-
sion structure, and calculate each transmission lines failure rate, under
assumption b.
• Step 3: Use the calculated failure rate, and equation 4, to apply the
reverse CDF sampling to find a sample of the failure time of each trans-
mission line.
• Step 4: Compare whether or not the sampled failure time is within
the time of the studied period. If the sample time is longer, then the
transmission line is not failed in the period, vice versa. Repeat the step
for all transmission lines.
• Step 5: Repeat step 1 to 4 for all the time windows in the hurricane
event.
It is noticeable that the set of transmission failures is generated based
on the random numbers and the probability of failure, so a Monte-Carlo simu-
lation is needed to generate enough sample, or “synthetic hurricanes to reflect
the average expected situation of the level of hurricanes.
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7.4 Cascading Outage Analysis model
The hurricane model creates a set of transmission line failures. In
order to address the short-term consequence following a set of transmission line
failures, sequential outage checkers to identify potential cascading process that
might lead to large blackouts are proposed. In this cascading outage model,
the line failures within a short time window, i.e., 5 minutes, are assumed as a
set of simultaneously applied initial disturbance. The detailed implementation
of the cascading outage analysis models has been discussed in Part I.
7.5 Storm hardening model
Some reports, such as [37], have discussed the storm hardening pro-
grams. Most of these programs are pointing to harden the components that
are either closer to the coast, or close to the path of potential hurricanes. The
rationale behind these programs is that the more those components are ex-
posed to the wind, the more likely they will fail, thus more valuable to harden.
However, as studied from the Cascading Outage Analysis model, and the his-
torical events, such as [189], it is noticeable that the components occur in the
cascading path are more valuable to harden, because not hardening those com-
ponents would potentially lead to a large cascading outage, while the failure
of lines close to the coast might only end up as localized blackout. The storm
hardening model in this project is based on the Monte-Carlo simulation results
of the hurricane models and Cascading Outage Analysis model. The Monte-
Carlo simulation is used to generate a large number of synthetic hurricanes.
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Each synthetic hurricane will contain all the information of the needed weather
forecast, as shown in Fig. 1. After simulating the hurricanes through the Cas-
cading Outage Analysis model, some components might repeatedly appear in
the potential sequence of cascades, meaning it is more likely these components
will fail in a hurricane initiated cascade. Therefore, these components will be
identified as the targets for storm hardening model.
7.6 Implementation and results
7.6.1 Implementation and test case
In order to implement the models and algorithms, a new graphical user
interface is designed with the algorithm written in Visual Basic for Applica-
tion, PowerWorld Scripts, Excel Scripts. Within the code, the graphical user
interface (GUI) is designed using the Visual Basic for Application; the Power-
World simulator is used in Transient Stability calculation, and the AC Power
Flow calculation; the frequency checker algorithm, along with the high-level
Monte-Carlo algorithm is implemented by the Visual Basic for Applications.
In our system an ERCOT 2008 summer planning case is used. Within the
model, the total load is approximately 71 GW. The one-line diagram for this
model is shown in Figure 7.4.
In the implementation, several assumptions are made, which could be
enhanced as discussed in the future research:
• These lines are assumed to be exposed at same level of the wind during
a hurricane.
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Figure 7.4: Network of ERCOT 2008 case
• The transmission lines, although different in lengths and number of
transmission structures, are assumed to have 50 transmission towers in
average.
• In order to calculate the failure rates, the time of the hurricane event is
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assumed to be 3 days.
7.6.2 Generation of one sample hurricane
In order to illustrate the hurricane model and the Cascading Outage
Model, one sample hurricane is simulated. All transmission lines that are
within, or have connecting bus in the south zone and Houston zone are selected,
which represents 2278 transmission lines in total. One sample of hurricane
is generated. We note that the average time to failure for sustained wind
speed less than 80 mph is multiple years, therefore the probability of the
transmission line failure in 5 minutes of 80 mph wind is negligible. In this
sample of hurricane, the wind speed climbs from 90 mph in the beginning, to
125 mph in an hour, and comes down to 110 mph till 90 minutes, the end
of the observation time. This hurricane is rated Category 3 according to the
Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale. A sample of corresponding transmission line
failures is created for this hurricane. In Figure 7.5, the sustained wind speed
and the corresponding number of transmission line failures are shown.A total
of 184 lines are out in the period of the hurricane.
Applying these transmission line failures to the Cascading Outage Anal-
ysis model, a cascade that involves three stages of outage, including load under
voltage and line overload is detected, and the system experiences a total system
blackout.
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Figure 7.5: One sample of a category 3 hurricane
7.6.3 Monte-Carlo simulation
The Monte-Carlo simulation is used as discussed in the previous sec-
tions. Different levels of sample hurricanes are generated. The maximum wind
speeds range from 70 mph to 120 mph. For each wind speed profile, 200 sam-
ples are generated. The Figure 7.6 shows the number of total transmission
line outages for hurricanes with different top sustained wind speed. The ideal
failure rate described in equation 7.1 is also plotted in this figure. As can be
seen from the figure, the number of transmission line failures generally follows
the trend of the failure rates, which is an exponentially increasing function of
wind speed.
The number of total system blackouts, and the load shedding for the
cases that do not black out are shown in the Fig. 10. Notice that when the
hurricanes have a top wind speed of 110 mph, the probability of having a
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Figure 7.6: Number of transmission line failures in each level of hurricane
total system blackout in our simulation is 0.21, but when the top wind speed
is increased to 120 mph, the probability of blackout increases to 0.82. This
dramatic increase of probability of having a blackout is due to the exponential
increase of number of transmission line failures.
7.7 Future work
As discussed in previous sections, the development of this tool involves
numerous approximations and assumptions. Therefore, the author believes
that there are a number of future enhancements that could be done in the
future. Some of them are listed below:
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Figure 7.7: the load shedding in different level of hurricanes
• The transmission lines are assumed to be exposed at same level of the
wind during a hurricane. Future research will try to differentiate the
exposure of wind to the transmission lines based on the geographical
information, and the wind profile.
• The transmission lines, although different in lengths and number of
transmission structures, are assumed to have 50 transmission towers in
average. Future research will try to differentiate the number of trans-
mission structures based on geographical information.
• In order to calculate the failure rates, the time of the hurricane event is
assumed to be 3 days. Additional flexibility will be introduced for the
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researcher to customize the selection.
• The translation velocity of the hurricanes, together with the wind profile
change will be more accurately modeled in the hurricane models.
• The current authorities do have pre-cautious plans for the coming hurri-
canes, especially big ones, such as reducing the load, or evacuation. Our
future research will also investigate these actions.
• The distribution system is not being modeled in the Cascading Outage
Analyzer, but they play a significant role in blackouts of the system
under hurricanes. Therefore the modeling of the distribution system will
be explored.
• Facing a natural disaster, e.g. hurricane, precautions such as warning
and evacuation may change the people’s behaviors. Therefore, the elec-
tricity load shape may be very different. Future research may study this
phenomenon and consider a more realistic load profile during the natural
disasters.
• In this tool, the repair and restoration of the power system are not con-
sidered. However, decisions and implementations on repair and restora-
tion play a vital role in natural disaster relief. At the same time, such
decisions and implementations involve numerous human factors and in-
frastructure interdependency factors. Future studies on these issues may
be very important.
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Part V
Conclusions
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In this dissertation, we discussed three main topics, namely cascading
outage analysis, integrated interdiction model, and power system resilience
under natural disasters.
In the cascading outage analysis part, an improved cascading outage
analysis model is proposed. Four outage checkers, namely the transient sta-
bility checker, the frequency outage checker, the line outage checker and the
voltage outage checker are implemented based on protective relay functions.
The outage checkers are operated according to a newly proposed algorithm to
determine the status of the resulting operating state or equilibrium. A case
study of the improved cascading outage model using the IEEE 118-bus sys-
tem and the IEEE 300-bus system is presented. Mitigation and prevention of
cascading outage has also been discussed.
In the integrated interdiction model part, we propose an improved in-
terdiction model to identify maximal electric grid attacks. The contribution
of the model is that it incorporates both short-term (seconds to minutes) and
medium-term (minutes to days) impacts of the possible attack. The medium-
term impacts are examined by an interdicted DC optimal power flow model
(I-DC-OPF). The short-term impacts are addressed by a cascading outage
analysis model (COA) that uses a set of systematically applied checkers to
perform the simulation of the cascading outage events and assess the short-
term impacts of a blackout subsequent to specified terrorist attacks. An integer
programming heuristic is applied that can utilize standard optimization soft-
ware (e.g. CPLEX) to solve master problems generated by the heuristic. The
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proposed model has been verified using the IEEE 300 Bus Test System and
IEEE RTS 96 Test System. Discussions of the results and future research plans
are also presented.
In the power system resilience under natural disaster part, we consoli-
date and review the progress of the research field towards methods and tools of
forecasting natural disaster related power system disturbances, hardening and
pre-storm operations, and restoration models. A tool to analyze power system
security under hurricane threats is proposed. It uses the published and avail-
able weather forecast information, such as the landing positions, approaching
angle, translation velocity, central pressure difference, maximum wind speed,
and gust factor, to feed in to a hurricane model that generates the failed
transmission line information as initial disturbance. The initial disturbance,
i.e. a set of failed transmission lines, are used in developed Cascading Outage
Analyzer, to produce the potential system conditions under such forecasted
scenario, and the subsequent hardening suggestions. Challenges and future
research opportunities are also presented in this part.
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